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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifteen years vociferous criticism has been leveled at the civil
litigation system in the United States. Criticism has been voiced by litigants
with horror stories, by a disenchanted general public and by overwhelmed prac-
ticing attorneys. Much of the criticism has focused on the symptoms of systemic
problems: overcrowded dockets, undue cost, delay, waste, and insensitivity to
human needs. Additional scholarly criticism has been directed at perceived fail-
ures of the adversary system-failures ostensibly rooted in conceptually and
technically flawed procedures which encourage frivolous filings, promote run-
away discovery and only begrudgingly authorize judicial control over cases at
any time prior to trial.'
This criticism has generated a flurry of activity and serious efforts to revamp
the rules of civil procedure. Recent efforts have not only tinkered with existing
See Batista, Sanctioning Attorneys For Discovery Abuse-The Recent Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Views From the Bench and Bar, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671 (1983);
Brazil, Improving Judicial Control Over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules For
Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875; Miller, The Adversarial Sys-
tem: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and
Discovery Reform: The Continuing Need For an Umpire, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 543 (1980); Rosen-
berg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV.
579.
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rules but dramatically reconceptualized important aspects of the adversarial pro-
cess itself. One indicia of the depth of current concern is the frequency of major
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were amended significantly four times over their first forty-one years
and were amended thrice between 1980 and 1985. Recent amendments have
created the "managerial judge" by actively introducing judges into the litigation
process from its outset, by authorizing judges to limit and control discovery
even before there is abuse or overuse and by liberalizing the standard for impos-
ing punitive sanctions to compel attorneys to streamline the process of litigation
through the elimination of "unreasonable" filings.'
In response to this national trend and to the Hawaii Judiciary's efforts in
improving judicial administration, the Hawaii state court system is also under-
going both restructuring and fine-tuning. The Judiciary has adopted a sophisti-
cated system of docket control,' tightened circuit court rules to facilitate case
preparation and settlement before trial4 and initiated an ambitious mandatory
arbitration program as part of its emphasis on alternative dispute resolution.'
Significantly, the Judiciary's Rules Committee is also presently considering sub-
stantial changes to the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure, including changes simi-
lar to those made in the federal rules concerning managerial judges.
Will the federal procedural innovations be effective? Or are they merely a
band-aid cure for a systemic ailment? Do they rest on a firm theoretical founda-
tion? What will this mean for judges, litigants, lawyers and the public? In Ha-
waii, what is and indeed should be the evolving role of the civil litigation
judge? Should the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to follow the
new federal rules and empower the managerial judge?
The first purpose of this article is to stimulate public discussion of these
questions by examining the impact of the proposed new managerial rules. Care-
ful scrutiny and discourse are essential in light of their potentially dramatic
effect upon Hawaii's civil litigation system. The second purpose is to recom-
mend adoption of new managerial rules 11, 16, 26(b)(1), 26(f) and 2 6(g) with
adjustments. These rules, sensitively applied, should enhance the overall quality
' See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983). See also
Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to
Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981) [hereinafter Peckham, Judge as Case Manager).
' The Hawaii Judiciary recently adopted a master calendar system designed to centralize
caseflow. The civil and criminal calendars in the First Circuit Court are each controlled by one
administrative judge in charge of case assignment and reporting. THE JUDICIARY, STATE OF HA-
WAIl, 1984-1985 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1985). In addition, civil case filing, tracking, calendaring,
and monitoring of orders and judgments are now computerized as part of the plan for a central-
ized statewide system of automation. THE JUDICIARY, STATE OF HAWAII, 1985-86 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 10 (1986).
4 HAW. CIR. CT. R. 12, 12.1.
5 HAW. ARB. R. (1986).
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of justice delivered through the Hawaii state courts by reducing litigation delay
and cost without unduly burdening attorneys or the courts, sacrificing judicial
impartiality or diminishing fair access.
This article starts with the concept of the managerial judge and its place
generally within the adversarial process. It next examines the concept's efficiency
rationale in the context of enhancing the quality of justice. Finally, it examines
specific provisions of the new federal rules which give judges significant mana-
gerial powers to pare down the pretrial process and quicken the resolution of
cases. The appropriateness of these rules is evaluated not only in terms of effi-
ciency but also in terms of the basic values underlying the civil litigation sys-
tem-particularly the values of participation and substantive effectuation.
Predicting the impact of the adoption of the new rules, of course, involves a
degree of conjecture. Missing as a backdrop are empirical studies involving the
Hawaii circuit courts. The recommendations, however, are rooted in considera-
bly more than guesswork. Numerous studies preceded the adoption of the new
federal rules in 1980 and 1983. Commentators at the time overwhelmingly
favored adoption. Five years of operation in the federal courts have yielded
generally favorable, albeit preliminary, results. The available data on the impact
of managerial judges and comments by judges themselves indicate that greater
efficiency has been achieved without sacrificing fairness. State court experiments
with managerial procedures also have found a marked reduction in delay and
pretrial cost.
Perhaps most important, this article's recommendations are directly in line
with the Hawaii Judiciary's policy goals. The recommendations appear to be
the next logical step for streamlining the Hawaii civil litigation process. Adop-
tion of the rules would keep Hawaii in the forefront of improvements in judi-
cial administration for state courts.' As Judge Peckham has observed:
[Tihe leaders of the American bar and bench now urge state jurisdictions to
abandon their traditional passive role of allowing lawyers to control the process of
the litigation, with all the cost and delay that ensue. Instead, the trial courts are
being asked to monitor and supervise aggressively their cases from start to finish.
I perceive that we are about to witness a dramatic change in the way most of our
state trial courts do business.'
6 In 1986, Hawaii Supreme Court Chief Justice Lum received the American Judges Associa-
tion's Award of Merit for his work on improving judicial administration.
' Peckham, A Judicial Response To the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discov-
ery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 254 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Peckham, A Judicial Response]. Judge Peckham is the Chief Judge for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California and is a primary exponent of the managerial
judge.
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II. "JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE DENIED:" THE PROBLEM OF CASE
CONGESTION AND MOUNTING PRETRIAL COSTS
A primary goal of the Hawaii Judiciary has been the reduction of case con-
gestion and ultimately the elimination of undue delay and cost in resolving
cases. The adage "justice delayed is justice denied"' has become even more
poignant over the last decade as court congestion and delays have worsened
across the country.' "Litigation explosion " 1 and "hyperlexis"" are the descrip-
tive terms often employed. Some dispute has arisen about the extent, impact
and even existence of the "litigation explosion. "1" Two facts, however, are un-
disputed: (1) case filings and the overall complexity of cases have increased
dramatically over the last fifteen years; and (2) the cost of litigating has soared.
A. Increased Case Filings
In 1985, then United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger
commented:
The caseloads in both federal and state courts experienced fantastic growth
during the past sixteen years. From 1969 to 1984, new filings annually in federal
district courts grew from 112,606 to 298,330. .... The cases passing through
the state court systems show a similar sharply upward curve. Numbers are only
part of the story; cases are becoming increasingly complex. Both trends are cause
for concern-and possibly alarm-when projected toward the twenty-first
8 Hoffman, Forward to FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGE-
MENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS vii (1977) ("Justice delayed may be justice denied or
justice mitigated in quality").
' In the late 1950's, then Chief Justice Earl Warren recognized the dangers of court congestion
and delays:
Interminable and unjustifiable delays in our courts are today compromising the basic legal
rights of countless thousands of Americans and imperceptibly corroding the very founda-
tions of constitutional government in the United States. Today, because the legal remedies
of many our people can be realized only after they have sallowed with the passage of time,
they are mere forms of justice.
Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, ABA Annual Meeting (1958), cited in Yager, Justice
Expedited-A Ten-Year Summary, 7 UCLA L. REV. 57 (1960).
10 Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: Examining the Critical
Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 319 (1985).
l Manning, "Hyperlexis," Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 767 (1977).
See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 61
(1983) (suggesting that the litigation explosion may be a myth created by an "elite" of judges,
professors, deans and practitioners).
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century.
1 3
Civil case filings in Hawaii state courts reached a peak in the six-year period
between 1977 and 1983,1' increasing by 150% in the First Circuit alone. 5
Although case filings have diminished somewhat since then, the most recent
statistics still indicate that the number of cases currently filed annually are 60%
greater than the number filed in 1977.1' In addition, available data, although
sketchy, suggests that the median time for disposition of civil cases17 increased
slightly between 1981 and 1986.1" Although this data paints a general picture
at best, it does underscore the importance of the Hawaii Judiciary's commit-
ment to improving procedures and reducing congestion, delay and undue cost.19
The increase in case filings nationwide is commonly attributed to the coales-
cence of legal developments and socio-psychological forces. Legislatures and
courts have recognized many new substantive2" and procedural21 rights by pro-
is Burger, Introduction to Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217
(1985) (Symposium). Nationally, annual civil filings in state courts increased 20% in the five-year
period between 1978 and 1983. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CASE FILINGS IN STATE
CouRTs 1 (1983).
" In 1981, the total case load for the Hawaii circuit courts was 34,000. In 1986, total case
load was 40,000-a 30 percent increase. In 1981, total case load for district courts was 880,000
cases. In 1986, case load was over one million cases. In 1981, total case load for the family courts
was 40,000. In 1986, total case load was almost 60,000-a 50% increase. Address by Hawaii
Supreme Court Chief Justice Herman Lum, American Conference of Judges (Oct. 22, 1986)
[hereinafter Chief Justice Lum's Speech].
"' The number of civil filings for the Hawaii First Circuit Court were: FY 1977-78, 3111; FY
1978-79, 3373; FY 1979-80, 3589; FY 1980-81, 3927; FY 1981-82, 5717; FY 1982-83,
6783. Civil filings since then declined some and then stabilized: FY 1983-84, 5181; FY 1984-
85, 4995; FY 1985-86, 4869. Information from Mitch Yamasaki, Office of the Administrative
Directors of the Courts, The Judiciary, State of Hawaii (Jan. 23, 1987).
16 Id. Part of the recent decrease in filings may be attributable to the state judiciary's aggres-
sive alternative dispute resolution program and such private mediation programs as the Neigh-
borhood Justice Center.
17 Median time of disposition was: FY 1981-82, 274 days; FY 1982-83, 263 days; FY 1983-
84, 402 days; FY 1984-85, 309 days; FY 1985-86, 282 days. Id.
1" Case backlog pressures have eased. The annual number of case terminations increased sub-
stantially as an apparent result of the court's use of a retired judge in 1983 to dispose of stagnant
cases and the employment of a "pure" master calendar system. Annual civil case terminations
have increased by twenty-nine percent. Chief Justice Lum's Speech, supra note 14.
" Conversations with Honolulu litigators revealed what appear to be two generally held per-
ceptions about litigation in the Hawaii First Circuit Court: (1) most cases proceed at a reasonable
pace, primarily due to the deadlines in the new Circuit Court Rules and the tough noncon-
tinuance policy maintained by Chief Administrative Judge Philip Chun; and (2) the litigation
system tolerates too many tenuous filings as well as excessive pretrial activity in a significant
number of cases.
go For example, federal legislation has created claims for sexual discrimination, truth-in-lend-
ing violations and interstate racketeering. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69
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viding a judicial forum for the vindication of interests society has come to deem
important. More attorneys are competing in the marketplace and advertising
has emblazoned "attorneys-for-hire" in the public consciousness.
Perhaps most significant, people are more aware of their legal rights and are
more willing to pursue them in court. Commentators view this trend both fa-
vorably and with alarm. They favorably view the assertion of bona fide claims
that heretofore went unasserted simply for lack of recognition.2" They also deem
salutary the assertion of novel claims, especially by politically and socially disad-
vantaged groups, that are plausibly rooted in lines of developing legal
thought.2" They view with alarm the "increased [and indiscriminate) tendency
to define personal problems and social troubles in terms of legal rights and
obligations . .. [which] cause an escalating case load for judicial institu-
tions."2 4 More people are looking to judges to resolve what are essentially nonle-
gal disputes.
The expansion of substantive rights, the increased availability of attorneys,
the aggressive advertisment of attorney services and a litigious societal outlook
encourage case filings in a procedural system already designed for easy initial
access. Conclusory pleadings supported by bare factual outlines will survive a
rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.2" Mechanisms es-
tablished to deter groundless filings have proven woefully inadequate. 6
Finally, economic incentives make lawsuits in this country easy to maintain
A.B.A. J. 442, 442-43 (1983) ("[In just the short span of (fourteen] years Congress has enacted
more than 100 statutes creating new claims, entitlements, and causes of action."). State courts
have created claims of strict products liability and wrongful termination of employment. See also
Miller, supra note 1, at 5-6.
21 Many new procedural rights have been recognized, especially in the context of administra-
tive agency regulation of private interests. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22 See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 29, 49. Simon notes that knowledge of one's legal rights is essential to the proper
functioning of the system. "IT]he poor, who are unable to purchase legal services, may remain
poor for precisely that reason. Their ignorance of the law puts them in an inferior bargaining
position which will prevent them from realizing the full value of their labor in the market." Id. at
49-50.
22 See infra note 25.
24 Sarat, supra note 10, at 321-22.
25 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 21, 47-48 (1957), established the enduring standard for satis-
faction of rule 8(a)(2)'s requirement of a "short plain statement of the claims showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." The Court in Conley stated that a complaint survives a rule 12(b)(6)
motion "unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 46-47. For a wonderful illustration
of the application of that standard, see Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d. Cit. 1944).
The official forms to the rules also aptly illustrate the minimal pleading threshold. See, e.g., FED R.
Civ. P. Form no. 9; HAW. R. Civ. P. Form no. 9.
"' See infra section IV(B).
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and acceptable to lose. The cost of responding to discovery requests is borne by
the producing party, and prevailing parties generally are not entitled to payment
of their attorneys' fees by the losing parties." When all of these forces combine,
justice within the system "becomes costly, slow, and as a result, inaccessible.
The goal of access to justice is defeated when too many claims overwhelm the
limited resources of the courts.""
B. Spiraling Litigation Costs
The cost of legal services, and litigation in particular, has sky-rocketed.29
Escalating cost has contributed to public cynicism about the judicial system and
lawyers."0 The direct victims of spiraling cost are the courts and litigants. Soci-
ety is also a victim as confidence in the judicial system diminishes and as fair
access to courts is inhibited. Acknowledging the insidious nature of such socie-
tal cost, the American Bar Association has taken the position that "(i]t is ethi-
cally wrong for the judicial resolution of disputes to be prohibitively
expensive. " "
Two major contributing factors have been identified. First, congestion due to
the sheer volume of cases has delayed disposition time and imposed additional
costs upon litigants and courts.3" Second, and more important, expansive use of
liberal pretrial procedures has fueled rising pretrial costs. Most of the strident
criticism of the civil litigation system has focused on the overuse of discovery
rules which were designed to maximize truth-seeking but which are often used
primarily as strategic weapons. 3 Justice Powell's comments are representative:
' The cost of responding to discovery requests is borne primarily by the party producing the
information. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 30-34. Most important, the "American Rule" on attor-
neys' fees precludes the prevailing party from recovering its fees from the loser. See generally
Rosenberg, Contemporary Litigation in the United States, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY: ENGLISH
AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 153 (H. Jones ed. 1977).
28 Sarat, supra note 10, at 322.
'9 It is estimated that in 1983 "the portion of the gross national product (GNP) attributable
to legal services was over $33 billion, representing a 58.6 percent increase in real terms [above
inflation] .. . over 1973." Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L.
REV. 219, 222 (1985). Although little data is publicly available, general consensus is that the cost
of litigating in Hawaii has risen markedly as fee rates have climbed and as more complicated
cases have been filed.
so See generally YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC., THE PUBLIC'S IMAGE OF COURTS (Na-
tional Center for State Courts 1978).
S' ABA ACTION COMM'N To REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY. ATTACKING LITIGATION
CosTS AND DELAY 59 (1984) [hereinafter ABA ACTION COMM'N].
3 See, Peckham, A Judicial Response, supra note 7, at 254 n.4.
" Professor Brazil's study of Chicago litigators found that between 80% and 92% of the
attorneys agreed that "the purpose of imposing work burdens or economic pressure on another
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Delay and excessive expense now characterize a large percentage of all civil litiga-
tion. The problems arise in significant part, as every judge and litigator knows,
from abuse of discovery procedures available under the rules. 4
Mounting criticism about delay and excessive pretrial cost compelled the
American Bar Association to create the Action Commission to Reduce Court
Costs and Delay. 8 The Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for
State Courts have assiduously studied the problem.3 6 In September of 1985 the
National Center and thirty-five cosponsoring organizations held a nationwide
conference on reducing cost and delay."
The overwhelming conclusion of these bodies and scholars is that the "key
[to reducing delay and costs] lies in controlling the pretrial process"3 8 and that
the key to controlling the pretrial process is the managerial judge.3 9
III. CASE MANAGEMENT AND THE MANAGERIAL JUDGE
A. Functions of the Managerial Judge4
The hallmark of the managerial judge is early intervention in and control over
party or attorney . . . had been a factor affecting their use of discovery tools." Brazil, Civil
Discovery: Lawyers' View of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 787, 857-58.
"' Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 55 F.R.D. 521 (1980) (Powell, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J., and Stewart, J., dissenting). Professor Brazil's study revealed that
"[e]ven litigators who frankly admitted that they were becoming wealthy primarily because of
fees attributable to discovery expressed amazement and concern about the rapid escalation of the
expense of conducting and complying with discovery." Brazil, Views From the Frontlines; Observa-
tions by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RE. J. 217,
233-34.
35 See, e.g., ABA ACTION COMM'N, supra note 31, at 2; P. CONNOLLY, JUDICIAL CONTROLS
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28 (Federal Judicial Center 1978).
" See Sipes, Reducing Delay In State Courts-A March Against Folly, 37 RUTGERS L. REv.
299, 303-04 (1985).
"' Id. at 309 n.49.
38 Miller, supra note 1, at 14.
"' The managerial judge in civil litigation is seen as a solution complemented by methods of
alternative dispute resolution. See generally Moukhad, CPR Working Taxonomy of Alternative Le-
gal Processes: Part IV, in ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION (Spec. supp. 1983).
The Hawaii First Circuit Court has embarked on an ambitious mandatory court-annexed arbi-
tration program for tort claims under $50,000. HAW. ARB. R. (1986). The 1986 Hawaii legisla-
ture, sitting in special session on tort reform, raised that ceiling to $150,000. Arbitral proceedings
are conducted by private volunteer attorneys screened initially by the court. Discovery is mini-
mized and firm deadlines for resolution of cases are imposed.
40 "Judicial administration," in its larger sense, has two components. The first might be
termed "system administration." This encompasses calendar control, computer tracking of filing
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the civil litigation process.4 Rather than waiting for the completion of substan-
tial discovery and an impending trial date, the managerial judge intervenes early
in the process and guides the pretrial development of the case. The entire pre-
trial phase of litigation is no longer left to often harried attorneys who essen-
tially proceed unsupervised according to strategic concerns and the pressures of
day-to-day law practice.
General consensus is that the intent of the original federal rules-the smooth
self-execution of the pretrial phase,"2 has been subverted by liberal pleading and
discovery rules, a hands-off judicial posture and attorneys' allegiance solely to
their clients.4" Expansive use of the rules of pleading and discovery is generally
considered imperative to the zealous representation of one's client. 4" One result
is a client well-served in terms of maximal development of the merits of his
position but perhaps ill-served in terms of ultimate costs and benefits. Another
result is a party's partial capitulation solely as a consequence of the threatened
cost of further litigation. In some situations an otherwise fair outcome on the
merits is nevertheless rendered "unjust" by the time lag or the psychic and
financial cost of achieving it. These are the concerns of the managerial judge.
As discussed below, after the filing of the complaint and answer the manage-
rial judge enters a preliminary scheduling order to get the case moving quickly.
In this manner, the judge controls the initial joinder of parties, the timely filing
of pleadings and establishes an initial discovery schedule."'
Rule II provides the managerial judge with the authority to control "unrea-
sonable" filings (pleadings and motions) through the application of a tighter
standard for sanctioning frivolous filings. The new standard eliminates subjec-
tive bad faith as the benchmark for imposing sanctions and substitutes a rea-
deadlines and a streamlined methodology for trial setting and assigning cases to judges. Responsi-
bility for these tasks falls with the administrative judge generally rather than trial judges. The
focus of this article is not on system administration but on the second aspect of judicial adminis-
tration-" individual case management."
The term "managerial judge" encompasses the single judge assigned total responsibility over a
case from the outset, as in the federal courts, or alternatively, as potentially in the Hawaii circuit
courts, the collective efforts of several judges performing various tasks related to different aspects
of a single case.
41 Comment, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescriptions to Ease the
Pain?, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 887, 890 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Prescriptions]. See also
Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Critical
Evaluation and A Proposal For More Effective Discovery Through Local Rules, 30 ViL. L. REV. 767,
789 (1985).
4" Prior to recent amendments, the rules were not intended to encourage judicial involvement
in the pretrial stage of litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note.
" "The chief source of frustration in processing cases is not outright rule violations or disobe-
dience of court orders but rather sheer overuse of the system ...... Miller, supra note 1, at 17.
" Comment, Prescriptions, supra note 41, at 903. See also HAW. C.P.R. Canon 7.
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). See infra section IV(a) for a detailed discussion of federal rule 16.
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sonableness standard.46 By design, this modestly heightens attorney responsibil-
ity to conduct an inital investigation, reduces stress on the court and litigants
and minimizes costly future fighting over meritless positions. Assuming a sensi-
tive judicial touch, this can be achieved without returning to the byzantine
intricacies of a code pleading system4 and without limiting access to the courts
or the inhibiting the assertion of novel yet plausible theories of law.4
The managerial judge also controls the pretrial process by controlling discov-
ery. He does so by setting discovery schedules pursuant to rules 16, 26(b)(1)
and 26(f), by preventing the filing of "unreasonable" discovery requests and
responses (through new rule 26(g)49 which is similar to rule 11), and perhaps
most important, by "limiting" discovery at the outset even before there has
been abuse or overuse. New rule 26(b)(1)(iii)5" empowers the managerial judge
to tailor and limit discovery according to the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the importance of the legal issues and, significantly, the resources of
the parties.
Finally, with a sense for development of the case, the managerial judge is
actively involved in searching for the earliest moment to achieve a fair settle-
ment. In contrast, the standard settlement conference under existing procedures
which, although effective, usually triggers settlement a month or less before
trial, after discovery is completed and trial preparation has begun. 5 1
40 See infra section IV(B) for a detailed treatment of federal rule 11.
4 In code pleading states tremendous resources are often expended fighting over the sufficiency
of pleadings. Code pleading generally requires a statement of "facts sufficient to state a caurse of
action," and parties battle over whether the allegations are indeed facts or mere legal conclusions
and whether the facts are evidentiary or ultimate. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Goodyear Service Stores,
258 N.C. 487, 128 S.E.2d 762 (1963). The notice pleading system of the federal and Hawaii
rules was designed to eliminate such technical requirements and the ensuing cost of challenges.
4' See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986). See infra
section IV(B)(5) for a discussion of the concerns over the adoption of new rule 11.
4 See infra text accompanying note 292.
00 See infra text accompanying note 278.
6 Even under the much-improved system in the Hawaii First Circuit Court, judges still do
not become involved in supervising, controlling or directing the development of the case except
where a case is designated complex litigation. The new circuit court rules require filing of detailed
pretrial statements (plaintiff's statement is due one year from the filing of the complaint and
defendant's responding statement is due sixty days later, subject to extensions granted by the
court) (HAW. CIR. CT. R. 12(a)(2)), witness lists (HAW. CIR. CT. R. 12(a)(2)(iv)), and settlement
conference statements (HAW. CIR. CT. R. 12.1(b)). Active judicial control of the case, however,
does not occur until shortly before trial, usually at the settlement conference or the pretrial confer-
ence in preparation for trial.
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B. Rationale for the Managerial Judge: Enhancing the Quality of
Justice-Reducing Delay and Pretrial Cost Without Sacrificing Impartiality or
Diminishing Fair Access
Although "quality of justice" is a phrase with myriad meanings, it can be
usefully defined and given practical effect. It must be the focal point of any
analysis of the appropriateness of new rules. Commentators assume that the new
powers of managerial judges will result in quicker disposition of cases and re-
duced pretrial activity and that this increased efficiency will necessarily mean
better quality justice.5" Indeed, as discussed below, researchers, judges, and
commentators agree that managerial rules implemented by committed judges
significantly increase judicial efficiency. The "inexpensive" resolution of disputes
is the primary value embodied in the federal procedural system.5" However,
other value must also be examined.
Greater efficiency does not assure that the judicial process will be fairer."'
Perhaps the starkest example involves the elimination of procedural due process
hearing rights. While this would provide greater judicial efficiency, the quality
of justice5" would suffer in many instances. If discovery is so truncated that
parties are encouraged to hide the "truth" or the pleading threshold is so high
that substantial access to the courts is inhibited, enhanced system efficiency will
be served but justice will not be served.
The impact of new managerial rules on the quality of justice might be most
productively assessed in terms of basic values underlying the process of civil
litigation. Efficiency is but one of values which underlie the common law civil
litigation system. At least four basic values other more qualitative than effi-
ciency are acknowledged as significant. These are, according to Professor
52 See, e.g., Franaszek, Justice and the Reduction of Litigation Cost: A Different Perspective, 37
RuTGERS L. REV. 337, 350 (1985) ("The rhetoric of reducing litigation cost attempts to fuse
justice with reducing expenses, often in a simplistic or conclusory manner. Although arguing that
the legal system is fairer when its cost is minimized, this rhetoric bypasses the troubling questions
of deriving justice from the market's allocation-and pricing-of litigation.").
5' The rules are to be "construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
See Franaszek, supra note 52, at 343-44.
BB One commentator has noted that the evaluation of the impact of litigation reform on the
quality of justice can be undertaken from either of two perspectives:
At its most extreme, inquiry into the quality of justice is a counterfactual inquiry, examin-
ing whether reform procedures make any difference in the substantive disposition of a
controversy. More commonly, however, analyses of this quality of justice explores whether
the reformed litigation process minimizes the possibility of erroneous decisions by provid-
ing a full and fair hearing. It is an evaluation of a procedure, not an end result. If the
procedure leaves unaltered the present configurations of the litigation system (except for its
cost), it is considered to be "just."
Franaszek, supra note 52, at 344.
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Michelman, dignity, participation, deterrence and substantive effectuation. 6 A
system single-mindedly geared towards efficiency risks disserving these values.
especially participation, as access is inhibited, and substantive effectuation, as
complicated or novel but socially important legal positions are deprived of full
development.
In light of the tension between efficiency and these values, the new manage-
rial rules could be said to enhance the quality of justice if they maximize access
to courts for those with nonfrivolous claims and allow for reasonable and fair
case development on the merits while minimizing unnecessary burdens on the
court and litigants. Enhancing the quality of justice in this manner is especially
important for defendants who might find it cheaper to settle than to litigate a
tenuous claim and for plaintiffs who might find it necessary to give up on a
bona fide claim because the cost of vindicating it is prohibitively expensive.5"
1. Efficiency
The standard reason proffered for the creation of the managerial judge is
increased efficiency. 8 Early intervention and tighter control mean less delay.
Reducing delay benefits the litigants by resolving disputes and defining rights
and obligations more quickly.5 " Less delay generally means less cost."0 Early
3 Briefly,
[d]ignity values reflect concern for the humiliation or loss of self-respect which a person
might suffer if denied an opportunity to litigate. Participation values reflect an apprecia-
tion of litigation as one of the modes in which persons exert influence, or have their wills
"counted," in societal decisions they care about. Deterrence values recognize the instru-
mentality of litigation as a mechanism for influencing or constraining individual behavior
in ways thought socially desirable. Effectuation values see litigation as an important means
through which persons are enabled to get, or are given assurance of having, whatever we
are pleased to regard as rightfully theirs.
Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part
1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172.
" The key, it would appear, is the system's pretrial capacity to (1) discourage "unreasonable
or unnecessary" filings, (2) limit discovery while allowing parties reasonable access to relevant
information, (3) pace reasonably pretrial activities, and (4) facilitate early settlement. See infra
section IV for an in-depth discussion of the impact of the new rules on these aspects of the
litigation system.
" See Franaszek, supra note 52, at 350, 362.
" Delay may be in the interest of certain defendants and their insurers who, assuming liabil-
iry, might find it more profitable to defer payment until the last possible moment, reasoning that
a possible assessment of prejudgment interest on the amount ultimately paid will be less than
their return on the amount invested during the "deferral" period.
"o The ABA Commission's study found that a reduction in case disposition time did not
necessarily result in a reduction in cost as measured by attorney time spent on each pretrial
activity. ABA ACTION COMM'N, supra note 31, at 64. The Commission noted, however, that to
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judicial control also means pared down pretrial activity. Fewer pleadings and
motions, and discovery tailored to the needs of the case translate into reduced
pretrial expenses. Less cost obviously benefits the court and the litigants already
before the court. It also expands opportunities for access for persons with meri-
torious claims who have been excluded from the judicial process due to the cost
of participation.
Initially, opponents of active case management asserted that it might be un-
necessarily costly." They contended that since the judge's time is the most ex-
pensive judicial resource, additional judicial supervision would further increase
costs." Growing evidence to the contrary seems to have tempered the criticism.
Nevertheless careful examination of the issue is warranted.
The goal and the apparent reality of case management is that the managerial
judge limits pretrial activity and "brings cases to settlement or trial sooner than
if their progress were left entirely to the impetus of the parties."O' Studies have
not definitively assessed the overall cost savings or the extent to which cost
savings are passed on to litigants. Studies are in agreement, however, that the
cost savings ultimately achieved through judicial management exceed any addi-
tional initial management costs. 6
a. Federal courts
The Federal Judicial Center studied various case management techniques,
focusing on six federal judicial districts.6 The Center concluded that early judi-
cial intervention, firm scheduling and oversight of discovery were effective man-
agement techniques.6 Average disposition time was cut in half.67
Judicial involvement in the pretrial phase of federal litigation has grown in
the extent the reduction of delay is a consequence of settlements earlier in the process, cost savings
to litigants will result since attorney time will be spent on fewer activities. id. at 65.
See, e.g., Resnik, Managerial judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 422-24 (1982).
, Professor Resnik has asserted that "[rather than concentrate all of their energy deciding
motions, charging juries, and drafting opinions, managerial judges must meet with parties, de-
velop litigation plans, and compel obedience to their new management rules." Id. at 423-24.
*3 Peckham, A Judicial Response, supra note 7, at 267.
"'Certain studies have demonstrated a high level of elasticity in judicial productivity, sug-
gesting that additional pretrial demands upon judges might be met with little or no impact on
existing judicial functions." Nordenberg, supra note 1, at 565-66. See also Will, Merhige &
Rubin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203 (1977). See infra note 155
and accompanying text concerning additional transitional costs from a traditional to a managerial
model.
"' CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DisTRicr COURTS 1, 5
(Federal Judicial Center 1977).
66 Id. at 33-35.
67 Id. at 19, 35.
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importance. 68 Judicial case management has been so effective that although the
number of case filings has increased, the average time of disposition has de-
creased.69 Delay "has been substantially reduced."7 "
b. State courts
The ABA Action Commission To Reduce Court Costs and Delay," estab-
lished in 1979, studied pilot programs using cost reduction measures in state
courts. The experiments focused on case management and simplified pretrial
procedures.72 The Commission concluded that for state courts, like federal
courts, "j]udicial caseflow management controls will decrease the time con-
sumed by litigation. Based on our work, we believe a comprehensive set of
controls following a case from its filing through disposition will produce the
most significant reductions in overall case processing time."7 " This conclusion
was later embodied in a new section to the ABA's Standard 2.50 - Caseflow
Management and Delay Reduction. 4 Most important, the Commission found
that time schedules, in combination with tailored discovery produced the great-
est reduction of pretrial activity. 6
The National Center for State Courts also exhaustively studied trial court
delay, concluding in 1978 that "the most promising technique for reducing
delay is court management of case processing from commencement to disposi-
tion."7.6 Several studies have since been conducted to examine the effectiveness
of case management in state courts. Although the type of management proce-
dures examined differed, all involved judicial control from the outset of a case.
The results were consistent on one key point: "court control of the pace of
litigation during all pretrial stages has produced dramatic improvements in
shortening the time required to bring disputes to a conclusion. '
Dramatic results were achieved in a case management experiment in Mari-
6 Judges' managerial powers were expanded by amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16 and
261(b) and 26 (g) in 1983. Amendments to rules 26(f), 33(c), 34(b) and 37(b)(2) were made in
1980 to control escalating costs.
6 Peckham, Judge as Case Manager, supra note 2, at 770.
10 Peckham, A Judicial Response, supra note 7, at 258.
, The Commission was created to test court procedures aimed at reducing delay and cost in
litigation. ABA ACTION COMM'N, supra note 31.
72 Id. at 1-2.
73 Id. at 21.
7" ABA STANDARD 2.50-CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT AND DELAY REDUCTION (1976).
75 ABA ACTION COMM'N, supra note 3 1, at 15.
76 Sipes, supra note 36, at 304 (citing T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, JUSTICE
DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PRECIS 64
(National Center for State Courts 1978).
77 Sipes, supra note 36, at 312.
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copa County Superior Court in Phoenix, Arizona. In one year the managerial
judges cut average case disposition time by more than one-third, reduced pend-
ing case loads by 36% and settled 31% more cases than non-managerial
judges. 8 The "Economical Litigation Project," which involved two experiments
in Kentucky circuit courts, also yielded significant results. The experiments were
conducted consecutively and covered four years, including follow-up interviews
with attorneys. The management procedures used a "case flow manager," who
was a court administrator to set and monitor pleading deadlines. Individual
judges thereafter monitored the cases and closely controlled discovery. 9 The
78 Id. at 304.
79 See Planet, Reducing Case Delay and The Costs of Civil Litigation: The Kentucky Economical
Litigation Project, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 279 (1985).
Under the ELP rules and using internal procedures developed by the court staff, a typical
civil case would be processed as follows.
1. Filing
The rules apply to contract, personal injury, property damage, and property rights cases.
From the time of filing, each ELP case is monitored by the court administrator acting as
caseflow manager to ensure service within thirty days and the filing of answers within
twenty days of service. Plaintiffs counsel is notified by telephone to effect service or move
for default. If plaintiffs counsel does not act upon the admonishments of the caseflow
manager, the judge sends a letter seeking counsel's cooperation in moving the case along.
2. Motions
Under the ELP rules, unopposed motions are presumed to be granted, and only opposed
motions are scheduled for hearing. The hearing date is set by the parties using a tight
rule-made schedule. . . . The judges routinely rule from the bench and take few motions
under advisement.
3. Discovery
A discovery conference is set for approximately two weeks after joinder. At the confer-
ence, which can be conducted by the judge in person or by telephone, a discovery plan is
made and later set forth by an order that includes a discovery completion date and either a
final pretrial conference or a trial date.
Under the rules, the use of depositions and interrogatories is limited. Depositions of the
parties can be taken by notice, but nonparty depositions of expert or fact witnesses are
allowed only by leave of court. The plaintiffs deposition must be taken by the defendant
before any other discovery is initiated. Interrogatories are limited to twenty single-part
questions per set. At the discovery conference, the judge considers counsels' requests for
more interrogatories or depositions of nonparty witnesses. Counsel's allotted discovery time
is based on the complexity of the case, the availability and access of witnesses for deposi-
tions, and factors unique to the case. The rules provide for a presumptive discovery period
of fifty days.
The original version of the ELP rules provided no deadline for the filing of summary
judgment motions, but a 1983 revision requires all such motions to be filed by the com-
pletion of discovery. At that time, which is ten days prior to the final pretrial conference,
the parties must also exchange certain pretrial information including lists of witnesses with
summaries of their testimony; descriptions of physical evidence and copies of documents to
be presented at trial; lists of experts, their qualifications, and summaries of their testimony;
and brief statements describing each issue of law and fact. Another modification of the
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ABA's Action Commission evaluated the raw data and found that time of dis-
position, pretrial activity and overall cost to litigants were all significantly
reduced:
1. Total case processing time from filing to disposition and elapsed time at major
litigation phases were both significantly reduced.
2. The number of procedural events (e.g., motions, discovery, hearings) was also
reduced.
3. These reductions were achieved without apparent impact on the case outcome.
4. Reductions in case processing time and procedural activity resulted in savings
in the amount of time spent on ELP cases by most attorneys.
5. These savings in attorney time resulted in reduced fees (twenty-four percent
reduction) to clients in hourly fee arrangements; contingent fee billings blocked
any such pass-through.
6. The reductions in case processing and attorney time and in the amount of
procedural activity were achieved without affecting the qualitative aspects of the
litigation process represented by attorneys' abilities to prepare adequately for trial
or settlement. 80
original ELP rules requires that this information also be filed with the court, and the
parties must file a certificate of compliance by the deadline date.
4. Pretrial Conference
The primary objective of the final pretrial conference is not to generate settlements but
to prepare for trial. The principal objectives of the conference are to simplify the issues,
resolve pending procedural issues, dispose of summary judgment motions, and ensure that
the attorneys will be prepared to make crisp evidentiary presentations at trial. While the
judge is urged to inquire into the status of settlement negotiations, this is done primarily
to determine the extent to which the trial calendar can be stacked. In simpler cases the
court bypasses the final pretrial conference entirely.
5. Trial
ELP cases are not given priority over other cases on the judge's civil docket. Under the
rules, trials should be held within thirty days of the final pretrial conference. The rules also
prohibit the continuance of trial unless counsel makes a showing of good cause.
6. Managing the ELP Docket
Under the ELP, cases are subject to internal operating procedures intended to eliminate
nonproductive time between litigation events and to maximize judge and court staff time.
Key is the function of a court employee designated as the caseflow manager, who monitors
ELP cases for compliance with the time standards contained in the rules, enabling the
court to centralize caseflow management. The caseflow manager is authorized to contact
counsel to ascertain the case status and may be involved in scheduling hearings, confer-
ences, and trials in ELP cases. The ELP rules also adhere to a strict continuance policy.
Using these management devices, judge time spent in administrative matters should be
reduced, and events are more efficiently scheduled to avoid court continuances.
Id. at 281-83.
80 id. at 284-85.
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These and other similar studies"' are not definitive and, of course, do not
guarantee identical results in the Hawaii courts. They do indicate, however, that
the managerial judge in the Hawaii courts is likely to make the civil litigation
system more efficient by reducing both delay and pretrial cost.
2. Assuring impartiality and preserving fair access
Innovations for greater systemic efficiency carry qualitative risks. In evaluat-
ing the qualitative impact of the managerial judge, two important points of
analysis emerge. The first is the appropriateness of the managerial judge in the
adversarial process in terms of judicial impartiality. The second is the impact of
the managerial rules on fair access to the judicial process.
a. The adversarial process and judicial impartiality
In light of current and projected needs of the civil litigation system, are we
willing to accept in concept a further modification of the classic adversarial
model to encompass managerial judges? Judges, the bar and the public must be
willing to accept and implement a subtle yet important shift in the roles of
judge and lawyer. In the federal courts, strong concern was initially voiced about
what was perceived to be the potentially deleterious impact of the managerial
judge upon the adversary system.8 2
For a time proponents and opponents of the managerial judge engaged in
heated debate."' The intensity of the debate has subsided as preliminary results
indicate the salutary effect of the federal managerial judge.
Opponents of the managerial judge argued that radical departure from the
role of judge as passive uninvolved arbiter was dangerously inconsistent with
classical notions of the adversary system. They also argued that the active mana-
gerial judge would become "interested" in the outcome of the case, therefore
tainted, and that his possibly biased direction of the pretrial phase of the case
would essentially be shielded from appellate review.8 4 In short, the managerial
judge would have raw power without accountability and be likely to exert too
great an influence on the case-the quality of justice would suffer.
" For example, the ABA Commission's study of time schedule management in Vermont
courts found reduced case disposition time. It also found, however, that in the absence of simpli-
fied pretrial procedures and judicial control over discovery, scheduling deadlines did not notice-
ably diminish pretrial activity. Id. at 75.
82 Resnik, supra note 61, at 430.
See generally Resnik, supra note 61; Flanders, Blind Umpires-a Response to Professor Resnik,
35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984).
" Resnik, supra note 61, at 429-30.
1987 / CASE MANAGEMENT
(1) The managerial judge as an evolutionary rather than revolutionary change
in the adversarial process
Concern about the managerial judge's "radical" alteration of the adversary
system seems to be rooted in a positivist view of law. The role of judges is to
assure "blind justice.""
the classical adversarial model
The classical positivist model of civil litigation assumes a society of individu-
als with conflicting interests who resort to a system of law to enable individuals
to resolve conflicts with some semblance of imposed order. The litigants are self-
interested gladiators who determine truth through combat. The judge is a neu-
tral, uninvolved observer whose role is to make the ultimate arbitral decision in
light of the "facts" presented within a rigid and defined system of procedure
designed to constrain excesses in the judge's actions. Law is viewed as system-
atic and objective in character, 86 and procedural rules simply "impose regularity
on the actions of the" judge.8
Although we cling to traditional positivist notions of individualism and blind
justice in the resolution of private conflicts between individuals,8 8 that model of
civil litigation for federal and Hawaii courts has been rejected. Both the Federal
and Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure, with the provisions for full discovery, and
liberal pleading and joinder, coupled with the general expansion of substantive
rights, have rendered the classical model anachronistic.89 Scholars have recog-
nized that the basic premise of this model, a society of individuals with con-
flicting interests looking to law solely as the sovereign's tool for neutral resolu-
tion of intensely individualized conflicts, does not reflect the reality or the
function of law in society.9" Law regularizes shared expectations about societal
interactions, and judges are not simply dispassionate oracles who blindly apply a
set of hardened rules to the information garnered and presented by the
parties."
8 The textual discussion of various theoretical models is necessarily abridged. Its purpose is to
provide a general conceptual overview for evaluating concerns about the managerial judge's im-
pact on the adversarial process.
8 See generally H. HART, THE CONCEFrT OF LAW (1961); Chayes, The Role of Judges in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1282-83 (1976).
87 Simon, supra note 22, at 43.
8 Resnik, supra note 61, at 381-83.
" Miller, supra note 1, at 7-8.
80 Simon, supra note 22, at 60.
91 See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposivist or realist
model.
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Although procedural rules are ostensibly "designed to deal with a technical
problem,""2 their actual function is far-reaching and their impact extends be-
yond the mere "technical problems." The reality is that without close supervi-
sion, individual litigants can manipulate neutral procedures to "thwart the en-
forcement of the substantive rules and to affect the exercise of state power in
accordance with their individual ends."9 When this occurs, judicial decisions
"result not from the neutral, systematic application of rules to given factual
premises, but from strategic exercise of procedural discretion by private par-
ties."194 Attorneys engaged in large case litigation, particularly construction and
antitrust litigation, will verify this reality.
The classical adversarial model does not account for this interaction between
judge and litigants and does not accurately reflect the effect of procedural rules
upon substantive norms.
"purposivist" model
Legal philosophers and judges within the common law system have laid bare
the failings of the classical model and have developed and refined what might
be generally termed a "purposivist" or "realist" view of the law and the process
of civil litigation.95 In general outline the purposivist model underlies the fed-
eral and Hawaii rules and influences the manner in which judges interpret and
apply rules of procedure. The basic premise of the purposivist model is that
people are bound together by shared norms. The purpose of law is not just to
maintain order, but also to "coordinate the actions of citizens so as to further
their common purposes as effectively as possible." 96
Societal norms, by definition, are generally self-enforcing, but not in all in-
stances. Substantive "law is a technical apparatus for advancement of social
norms; '  and rules of procedure are the tools for that advancement. Thus, in
terms of both substance and procedure, "[j]udges reach behind rules directly to
the social purposes the rules are intended to serve and when they find the rules
" Simon, supra note 22, at 44.
93 Id.
9 Id.
95 See e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); R.
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW chs. 7-8 (1921); L. Brandeis, Business-A Profession,
The Opportunity in the Law, The Living Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION, 1-12, 313-27, 344-63
(1914); Pound, The Lawyer as a Social Engineer, 3 J. PUB. L. 292 (1954). See also H. HART & A.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, ch. II
(1958) (unbound edition prepared for classroom use).
Simon, supra note 22, at 62.
I d. at 63.
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wanting in light of the relevant purposes, they . . .modify the rules.''9" Im-
plicit in this view is the recognition that the manipulation of procedural rules
can alter substantive outcomes and that judges must therefore carefully scruti-
nize private use of supposedly neutral state-authorized procedures.
This belief appears to inform federal and Hawaii judges' wide-ranging inter-
pretations of procedural rules in the "interest of justice"99 and the judicial en-
grafting of principles such as "prejudice" onto the literal terms of the rules.' 00
Judges use these concepts correctively to avoid results that flow from the literal
provisions of rules, but which are inconsistent with strongly perceived norms of
either procedural and substantive fairness."0 ' Although the rules of procedure
provide a sturdy framework for litigation, there is considerable play in the
joints. Responsibility devolves to the judge to assure that litigants exercise that
play fairly according to larger norms of procedural fairness.
So, despite lingering positivist notions, we already have in place a flexible
procedural system which belies the concept of the dispassionate, completely
uninvolved judge who makes no value judgments in rigidly administering a
case or deciding a dispute. We have a procedural system in which judges are
I8 d. Professor Llewellyn's comments are apt.
Far be it from me to dispute that the concepts of substantive rights and of rules of
substantive law have had great value. They moved definitely and sharply toward fixing the
attention of thinkers on the idea that procedure, remedies, existed not merely because they
existed, nor because they had value in themselves, but because they had a purpose. From
which follows immediate inquiry into what the purpose is, and criticism, if the means to
its accomplishment be poor. They moved, moreover, to some extent, toward sizing up the
law by significant life-situations, instead of under categories of historically conditioned,
often archaic remedy-law: a new base for a new synthesis; a base for law reform.
K. LLEWELLYN. JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 11 (1962). The purposivist
model has been criticized as too illusive-that no two judges will have the same perception of
social norms. This illusiveness is said to diminish the legitimacy of the procedural system because
the public perceives the system as arbitrary in implementation.
"B The rules are to "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. FED. R. CIv. P. 15 provides: "[L)eave [to amend) shall be freely
given as justice so requires."
100 See Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1977); Bail v. Cunning-
ham Bros., Inc., 452 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1971); Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc., 139 F.
Supp. 408 (E.D. Pa. 1956). See also Wong v. City & County of Honolulu, 66 Haw. 389, 665
P.2d 157 (1983).
10 For example, in International Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Woods, Haw. -, 731
P.2d 151 (1987), the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in a mortgage foreclosure action that al-
though the mortgagor failed to comply with the express appeal certification requirements of rule
54(b) the court would entertain the mortgagor's appeal of the interlocutory decree of foreclosure.
The court noted that a contrary ruling would mean loss of the mortgagor's home before an appeal
could be properly filed. The court then expressly limited its ruling to the mortgagors before it,
declaring that all mortgagors in future actions would have to comply with the certification re-
quirements of rule 54(b).
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involved in assessing values and social norms as a means for fairly operating the
system and doing justice.'0°
Indeed, federal and Hawaii judges already make countless pretrial value
judgments that shape the course of the litigation, and in many instances, ulti-
mate results. Judges rule on the sufficiency of pleadings (should a litigant be
allowed to burden the system by being allowed to get to the discovery phase to
determine if she has a legitimate claim), control aspects of discovery (at least
after problems arise, through protective orders, orders compelling discovery, and
sanctions) and orchestrate settlements. In doing so, they make implicit value
judgments about the social and legal importance of the issues, the importance
of providing a judicial forum for the plaintiff, the need for information in light
of the cost of obtaining it, the relative interests and financial strengths of the
parties and the sincerity of the efforts of the parties and their attorneys in their
use of the system.'
The role of the active managerial judge, therefore, is less a revolutionary re-
casting of the role of the civil litigation judge in the adversarial process. The
managerial judge is an evolutionary extension in light of current needs.
(2) Concerns about impartiality
Assuming general acceptance of the concept of the managerial judge in the
adversarial process, do the specific powers conferred upon judges by new rules of
procedure enhance or at least preserve procedural fairness? As discussed above, it
appears that new rules 11, 16, 26(b)(1), 26 (g), and 26(f), which coalesce into
powers of the managerial judge, would increase efficiency of the Hawaii
102 One judge candidly described the process as follows:
[T~he judge really decides by feeling, and not by judgment; by "hunching" and not by
ratiocination, and . . . the ratiocination appears only in the opinion . . . the vital moti-
vating impulse for the decision is an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong for that
cause, and .. . the astute judge, having so decided, enlists his every faculty and belabors
his laggard mind, not only to justify that intuition to himself, but to make it pass muster
with his critics ....
Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL
L.Q. 274, 285 (1929).
"' Professor Llewellyn discusses "a sophisticated reversion to a sophisticated realism:"
Gone is the ancient assumption that law is because law is; there has come since, and
remains, the inquiry into the purpose of what courts are doing, the criticism in terms of
searching out purposes and criticizing means. Here value judgments reenter the picture,
and should. Observing particular, concrete facts of conduct and of expectation which sug-
gest the presence of "an interest," one arrives at his value conclusion that something in
those facts calls for protection at the hands of state officials.
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 98, at 22.
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courts.'" Would those rules, implemented by the managerial judge, taint the
pretrial process by removing the cloak of disinterested judicial impartiality?
The principal criticism of case management has been that fairness in the
pretrial process is jeopardized under the new rules since the judge, in managing
of the pretrial process, interacts intimately with the parties and their attorneys
and becomes a participant in shaping the litigation, thereby diminishing objec-
tivity. In addition, a judge's view is thought to be colored by considering mat-
ters inadmissible in evidence at trial.'" 5 Professor Resnik has maintained that
not only will awareness of inadmissible evidence taint a judge's perception of
the final outcome, frequent intimate pretrial contact will prejudicially influence a
judge's handling of a trial."0 6 This danger is exacerbated, it is contended, be-
cause control over the pretrial process is especially susceptible to abuse since it is
shielded from appellate review. 10 7
These are weighty criticisms. Responses, principally by judges, have been
strong and seem persuasive. The notion of impartiality advanced by critics of
managerial judges appears to be unrealistically based on the positivist concept of
the arbiter who retains his neutrality by avoiding contact with parties' pretrial
skirmishings. But, as Judge Peckham has eloquently put it, "[i]mpartiality is a
capacity of mind-a learned ability to recognize and compartmentalize the rele-
vant from the irrelevant and to detach one's emotions from one's rational- facul-
ties.' 0 8 Modern civil litigation systems are built upon this concept of imparti-
ality. In many pretrial situations, such as in rulings on evidentiary motions,
judges are exposed to inadmissible material.10 9 In these situations, "we do not
consider the judicial mind contaminated. ""0 In the experience of Judge
Peckham, judges are eminently capable of impartially sorting through the type
of information considered by judges in resolving discovery disputes or making
scheduling decisions."' As Professor Miller has aptly noted, "[t]he goal of judi-
cial neutrality . . .does not require judicial ignorance. The notion that justice
is or ought to be blind should extend only to ensuring impartiality.''12
One meritorious suggestion is that impartiality and even-handed managerial
decisions can be encouraged by conducting status and pretrial conferences, in-
14 See supra notes 58-80 and accompanying text.
105 Resnik, supra note 61, at 426-31.
o Id. at 427.
107 Id. at 429-30.
o Peckham, A Judicial Response, supra note 7, at 262.
'" On issues of relevance under rules 401-403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[r]uling
requires knowledge of the lawyer's strategies and the full contour of the case being developed."
Flanders, supra note 83, at 520.
110 Peckham, A Judicial Response, supra note 7, at 262.
... Id. at 263.
112 See generally Miller, supra note 1.
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cluding dispositions of discovery disputes, on the record."1 3 This would provide
a detailed record for appellate review. A useful record could also be generated
through pretrial conference orders supplemented by recorded attorney commen-
tary on objectionable aspects of the orders.
Providing a solid record would be consistent with the apparent movement in
federal appellate courts away from almost total deference to lower court pretrial
decisions 1 4 to a posture of moderate scrutiny under the abuse of discretion
standard." 5 Although the absence of a final judgment would preclude interloc-
utory review of pretrial decisions in most instances,"16 moderate appellate scru-
tiny even after final judgment would serve to rectify serious mismanagement
decisions"' and establish workable parameters for future decisions. This could
be accomplished without opening the appellate floodgates since relatively few
cases would reach the final judgment stage for appeal.
The current practice in the Hawaii circuit courts, having pretrial procedures
including settlement conferences, conducted by a judge who does not handle the
actual trial would more adequately address many of the aforementioned con-
cerns about impartiality." 8 Thus, the concerns about improper judicial bias,
although signalling a need for constant caution, should be addressable through
judicial sensitivity, a scrutinizing private bar, modest appellate review based on
a solid record of pretrial proceedings and, at least in Hawaii, a separation of
pretrial and trial judges.
b. Fair access
Another and perhaps more significant potential adverse effect of the manage-
rial rules is the subtle diminishing of fair access to the judicial process. "Ac-
cess," as used here, encompasses both initial entry into the system and the
l" Peckham, A Judicial Response, supra note 7, at 263.
14 Se, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) ("The authority of a court to dis-
miss [a plaintiff's action) sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an
'inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs .... ").
11 See, e.g., Silas v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 586 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1978) (trial court's
discretion to impose an appropriate solution for a party's noncompliance with a pretrial order is
broad but not unlimited). See generally Peckham, Judge as Case Manager, supra note 2.
"6 See, 28 U.S.C. S 1291 (1982); Id. S 1292. But see HAW. REv. STAT. S 641-(1)(b) (1985),
stating that "an appeal . . . may be allowed . . . whenever the circuit court may think the same
advisable for the speedy termination of litigation before it." This statute, unlike the federal stat-
ute, could be used to appeal all pretrial decisions in Hawaii circuit courts, upon certification of
the appeal by a circuit court judge.
117 Egregious mismanagement decisions might be corrected immediately through writs of
mandamus or prohibition.
"0 HAW. CIR. CT. R. 12.1.
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ability reasonably to develop the merits of one's legal position. "Fair" access is
diminished where unduly harsh threshold requirements chill plaintiffs from
bringing potentially meritorious claims that are based on plausible extensions of
existing law or novel legal theories rooted in evolving societal concerns, or where
unduly truncated discovery opportunities prevent fair development of important
aspects of difficult cases.
Procedural innovations, however efficient, which preclude participation in
these ways undermine the system's quality of justice. The system is qualitatively
undermined by retarding the evolution and development of the law, by fueling
public sentiment that the system is unresponsive to societai concerns and by
effectively excluding people, especially those without recourse through political
channels, who have no other means for vindicating rights society is on the verge
of recognizing as legally significant."i 9
The drafters of the new federal rules were aware of this potential problem.
The new rules were intended to reduce cost and delay without diminishing fair
access. As discussed in detail in part IV, the rules on their face are structured
with ample flexibility to assure fair access and courts have been applying them
accordingly.
120
Briefly, rule 1 's attempt to deter "unreasonable" filings is not intended "to
chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity." 1' 2 In an effort to assure fair access
federal courts have drawn a high line between frivolous claims subject to sanc-
tions and novel claims with a plausible legal basis: a claim is "legally unreasona-
ble" only if it bears no chance of success under existing precedents and where
no reasonable argument can be made to extend, modify or reverse existing
law. 12
2
Indeed, the overall impact of the managerial rules may well be to enhance
fair access. Discovery rules 26(b)(1), 26(f) and 26 (g) are intended, inter alia, to
limit discovery according to the importance of the issues, the needs of the case,
the amount at stake and the resources of the parties. 12' This should expand
access opportunities for persons of modest means.
Fair access, however, may be inhibited in another manner under the new
rules-if the managerial judge becomes overly zealous in limiting discovery and
prevents fair development of important legal positions. This is a concern with
119 See infra notes 247-249 and accompanying text. Professor Rawls approaches "justice" fo-
cussing on a system's treatment of the least advantaged. The moral value and social efficacy of a
legal system, according to Rawls, should be measured by the system's capacity to accord those
least advantaged the equivalent opportunity to achieve fair substantive outcomes as those of
greater advantage. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
120 See infra notes 247-249 and accompanying text.
, See infra note 247.
, See infra text accompanying note 246.
123 See infra section IV(C).
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due process overtones. While rules do confer considerable discretionary
power,' 24 that power is set within parameters that attempt to accommodate two
competing concerns: minimizing the overuse of pretrial rules as strategic weap-
ons and facilitating the quest for relevant information. Managerial judges have
been sensitive to this accommodation. Thus far state experiments have con-
cluded that managerial judges have not negatively affected the qualitative pre-
trial development of cases, quality quality measured in terms of an attorney's
ability to develop the case for trial. 25 While these experiments are not the last
word on the issue, they indicate that judicial sensitivity in implementing the
new discovery rules can go a long way towards accommodating the competing
concerns.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE MANAGERIAL RULES: NEW RULES 11, 16 & 26
This section examines the prominent provisions of the "managerial" rules in
the context of the foregoing discussion on enhancing the quality of justice.
A. Judicial Control Over the Pretrial Process-New Rule 16
New rule 16 provides the main vehicle for early judicial control over the
pretrial process. Its purpose is to reduce delay and cost by making case manage-
ment standard practice while allowing for less active judicial handling of cases
requiring minimal supervision.'
6
The 1983 amendments to federal rule 16 concerning pretrial conferences were
the first changes to the rule since its enactment in 1938. The original version of
the rule, which is identical to the current Hawaii rule, had been soundly criti-
cized as ineffectual. The Advisory Committee noted four principal criticisms:
1. [pre-trial] conferences are often seen as a mere exchange of legalistic conten-
tions with no real analysis of the particular case;
2. the result is frequently nothing more than an agreement on minutiae;
3. [pre-trial] conferences are seen as unnecessary and time-consuming in cases that
124 See sapra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
126 The Advisory Committee recognized that an amendment to rule 16 "is necessary to en-
courage pretrial management that meets the needs of modern litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 16
advisory committee note. The Committee noted that "when a trial judge intervenes personally at
an early stage to assume judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for completion by the
parties of the principal pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently
and with less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their own devices." Id. See also
FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DisTRicT
COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1977).
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will be settled before trial;
4. [pre-trial] meetings can be ceremonial and ritualistic with having little effect
on the trial and being of minimal value, particularly when the attorneys attending
the sessions are not the ones who will try the case or lack authority to enter
binding stipulations.117
In response to these criticisms and in light of the evolving role of the manage-
rial judge, the Advisory Committee amended rule 16 in three important areas.
First, the new rule is far more encompassing in scope. Former rule 16 was
narrow in focus; it was designed to frame issues for trial. The new rule autho-
rizes the court to call pretrial conferences to manage all phases of the pretrial
process.'" 8 In addition to framing issues and facilitating trial preparation,' 29 the
127 FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note.
I12 Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 provides:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the
attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference
or conferences before trial for such purposes as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control as that the case will not be protracted
because of lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more preparation, and;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
(b) Scheduling and Planning. Except in categories of actions exempted by district court
rule as inappropriate, the judge, or a magistrate when authorized by district court rule,
shall, after consulting with the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented, by a sched-
uling conference, telephone, mail, or other suitable means, enter a scheduling order that
limits the time
(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings;
(2) to file and hear motions; and
(3) to complete discovery.
The scheduling order also may include
(4) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference, and trial;
and
(5) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
The order shall issue as soon as practicable but in no event more than 120 days after filing
of the complaint. A schedule shall not be modified except by leave of the judge or magis-
trate when authorized by district court rule upon a showing of good cause.
(c) Subjects to Be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any conference
under this rule may consider and take action with respect to
(1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of
frivolous claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents, and
advance rulings from the court on the admissibility of evidence;
(4) the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative evidence;
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rule is expressly designed to establish early judicial control to avoid unduly pro-
(5) the identification of witnesses and documents, the need and schedule for filing
and exchanging pretrial briefs, and the date or dates for further conferences and for
trial;
(6) the advisability of referring matters to a magistrate or master;
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute;
(8) the form and substance of the pretrial order;
(9) the disposition of pending motions;
(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or
protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal
questions, or unusual proof problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
At least one of the attorneys for each party participating in any conference before trial shall
have authority to enter into stipulations and to make admissions regarding all matters that
the participants may reasonably anticipate may be discussed.
(d) Final Pretrial Conference. Any final pretrial conference shall be held as dose to the time
of trial as reasonable under the circumstances. The participants at any such conference shall
formulate a plan for trial, induding a program for facilitating the admission of evidence.
The conference shall be attended by at least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial
for each of the parties and by any unrepresented parties.
(e) Pretrial Orders. After any conference held pursuant to this rule, an order shall be
entered reciting the action taken. This order shall control the subsequent course of the
action unless modified by a subsequent order. The order following a final pretrial confer-
ence shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice.
(f) Sanctions. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if
no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a
party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a
party or party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or his
own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others
any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B),(C),(D). In lieu of or in addition to any
other sanction, the judge shall require the party or the attorney representing him or both
to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, in-
duding attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
In contrast, HAw. R. Civ. P. 16, which is identical to the original version of Federal rule 16,
provides:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear
before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings to
be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amend-
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tracted case development,"' 0 to discourage wasteful or dilatory pretrial tactics"3 1
and to promote early settlement.
1 3 2
The new rule reflects the Advisory Committee's sentiments on the expanded
range of concerns of the managerial judge and lists items for consideration dur-
ing pretrial conferences. Among the significant new items are the "elimination
of frivolous claims or defenses" at the outset,' 3 the appropriateness of referral
of the dispute to an alternative dispute resolution mechanism,13 4 early settle-
ment ' 5 and the need "for adopting special procedures for managing difficult or
protracted actions."'136 To enhance productivity, the rule requires the presence
of an attorney for each party who is authorized to enter into stipulations on
matters "participants may reasonably anticipate may be discussed .... .-
Second, new rule 16 mandates the issuance of a scheduling order within 120
days of the filing of the complaint.1 8 The mandatory aspect of the scheduling
order is revolutionary. It is rooted in the conclusion of numerous studies indi-
cating that scheduling orders significantly reduce case disposition time"3 9 and in
the apparent belief that judges will not bother to generate scheduling orders
unless so compelled.
The scheduling order sets initial time limits for joinder of parties," '0 amend-
ments of pleadings,"' filing and hearing of motions" 2 and completion of dis-
covery." 3 The rule 16 scheduling order, in conjunction with rule 26(b)(1) re-
ments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the
matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admis-
sions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent
course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in
its discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar on which actions may be placed for
consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to
non-jury actions or extend it to all actions.
129 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(4).
'30 FED R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2). For an interesting discussion on creating an accelerated pretrial
schedule utilizing alternative dispute resolution and modifications to rule 16, see McMillan &
Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 431 (1985).
131 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(3).
132 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
133 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1).
134 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
135 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
136 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(10).
137 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
138 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
139 See supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
140 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(l).
141 Id.
142 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2).
143 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3).
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garding discovery limitations and the optional rule 26(f) discovery
conference," 4 ' is intended to establish realistic time constraints according to the
needs of the particular case. This individual tailoring of timetables should pro-
vide for greater efficiency than a single system-wide timetable for all cases."'
Realistic timetables effectively control both the pace and quality of pretrial ac-
tivities. They
stimulate litigants to narrow the areas of inquiry and advocacy to those they
believe are truly relevant and material. Time limits not only compress the amount
of time for litigation, they should also reduce the amount of resources invested in
the litigation. Litigants are forced to establish discovery priorities and thus to do
the most important work first."
Flexibility is built into the scheduling order mandate. Parties can seek to
amend the order for "good cause.'" 4" Rule 16 also authorizes the court, via
local rules, to exempt categories of cases from the mandatory scheduling or-
der.'" For example, cases with less than $25,000 in controversy may tend to be
self-limiting in terms of the pretrial process and may not need a scheduling
order. Rule 16 contemplates a blanket exemption for such cases.
Third, new rule 16 authorizes the managerial judge to impose sanctions. The
former rule made no provision for sanctions, although courts sometimes drew
upon their inherent powers to impose sanctions."' Sanctions are authorized for
failure to obey pretrial or scheduling orders, for failure to appear at pretrial
144 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
146 Where local court rules establish a single timetable for all cases, that timetable could be
viewed as setting the outer time limits. See HAW CIR CT. R. 12 for an example of a single
timetable that applies to all cases.
146 REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCE-
DURES 28 (1979).
147 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The "good cause" standard for modifying the scheduling order is
less stringent than the "substantial hardship" standard embodied in other rules. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3). The Advisory Committee did not want undue difficulry in obtaining modifications to
compel attorneys to seek initially "the longest possible periods for completing pleading, joinder
and discovery." FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note.
140 Although a mandatory scheduling order encourages the judge to become involved in case
management early in the litigation, subdivision (b) "envisions that there are some categories of
cases which are routine, which historically are seldom tried, which often are filed for tactical
reasons or other reasons, and it would be an unnecessary burden on counsel and the court to enter
a scheduling order." Address by Charles E. Wiggin, Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial
Circuit of the United States, 101 F.R.D. 161, 179 (1983) [hereinafter Wiggin Speech]. Subdivi-
sion (b) of rule 16 "permits each district court to promulgate a local rule under Rule 83 exempt-
ing certain categories of cases in which the burdens of scheduling orders exceed the administrative
efficiencies that would be gained." FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note.
149 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f advisory committee note.
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conferences, for being substantially unprepared to participate in such conferences
and for refusing to participate in good faith.1"' The sanctions specified in the
rule are inclusive and range from orders of default to assessments of attorneys
fees. 5 The Advisory Committee hoped to assure vigorous use of rule 16 as a
management tool by providing a range of sanctions to encourage attorney
compliance.'15
New rule 16's goals and scope are thus exemplary. They appropriately ex-
pand the powers of the judge to control the pretrial process. The mandatory
scheduling order in section (b), however, introduces several potential adminis-
trative problems.
When 'should the scheduling order be entered? Is the 120 day deadline real-
istic? A scheduling order will be effective only if the outlines of the case have
developed sufficiently to suggest the ultimate number of parties involved, the
significance and complexity of the issues and likely discovery needs. A perfunc-
tory scheduling order based on a bare-bones complaint and answer will not be
an order tailored to the needs of the case. Federal court experience has yet to
determine the wisdom of the 120 day deadline. A more workable deadline
might be 180 days, or six months. This would allow for completion of basic
pleadings and preliminary discovery (interrogatories and document produc-
tions). At this stage of the litigation the court and counsel may be better able to
evaluate the needs of the case and fashion a meaningful scheduling order that
provides realistic discovery guidance."'
Will the mandatory scheduling order, which must be preceded by some form
of judge/attorney contact, be ineffectual if not wasteful for certain categories of
cases? Undoubtedly so. As mentioned above, 54 section (b) builds in flexibility
by authorizing local rule exemptions. The administrative problem lies in ade-
quately pre-defining exempt categories and in fitting actual cases into those cat-
egories. Categories readily definable according to fixed criteria-such as amount
in controversy-may not in practice adequately demarcate cases for which
560 Under subdivision (f), the judge has discretion to impose sanctions under rule 37(b)(2)(B),
(C), or (D) and/or assess reasonable expenses incurred resulting from noncompliance, including
attorneys fees.
151 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
152 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) advisory committee note ("explicit reference to sanctions reenforces
[sic] the rule's intention to encourage forceful judicial management").
16' Another option is to schedule a mandatory pretrial conference to coincide with defendant's
filing of its pretrial statement. Under Hawaii Circuit Court Rule 12(a)(8) the responsive pretrial
statement is due 60 days after plaintiffs pretrial statement is filed, which is due one year after the
complaint is filed. No such conference is currently held. The parties would be as much as six
months from trial and in practice substantial discovery is conducted during that period. See HAW.
CIR. CT. R. 12(a)(e). A scheduling/discovery order entered at that time might productively guide
the remainder of the pretrial process.
1"4 See supra note 148 for a discussion of section (b).
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scheduling orders are counterproductive. Categories defined by important but
soft factors-such as importance or complexity of the issues, difficulty of discov-
ery, obstinance of counsel-require preliminary factual development and judg-
ment calls. This problem appears to be eminently solvable over time. Trial and
error tinkering with exempt categories is one approach.
Another potential administrative problem involves the initial availability of
judicial resources. The transition to mandatory scheduling orders and early pre-
trial conferences may entail initial commitment of additional judicial resources.
The commitment involves "additional" start-up resources because judges will
be required to do more at an earlier time. The commitment is "initial" because
studies and federal court experience indicate that as cases are processed through
the system the overall cost and time savings will far surpass additional up-front
judicial costs."'
Finally, a pure master calendar system requires some modification to accom-
modate rule 16's mandatory scheduling order and early pretrial conferences.
New rule 16 was structured with the federal courts' "individual assignment"
system in mind. Under this system, each case is assigned to a particular judge
when it is filed.'"
That judge is responsible for all aspects of the case-from pleading to post-
trial motions. In contrast, the Hawaii's First Circuit Court segregates judges
according to function under a master calendar system. The average civil case
will see at least three judges-one for motions, one for settlement shortly before
trial and one for trial. How adaptable is the master calendar system?
Commentators generally believe that a judge in an assignment system is
more motivated to monitor and expedite his cases because he feels greater
individual responsibility for those cases . . . [and any] lack of diligence and
organization will soon be reflected in the increase in his pending case load.""5 7
They also believe, however, that active case management is appropriate in a
master calendar system."' 8 Judge Peckham has noted that it is possible to "in-
tegrate effective case management with a master calendar system . . . (and]
state court judges who prefer the master calendar system should not hesitate to
institute case management techniques because of the fear that their efforts will
155 See supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
14 Federal district courts changed from a master calendar system to an individual assignment
system in 1969.
157 Peckham, A Judicial Response, supra note 7, at 257. See also Enslen, Should Judges Manage
Their Own Caseloads, 70 JUDICATURE 200 (1987).
1 An early study by the ABA Commission On Standards of Judicial Administration con-
duded that "the success of caseflow management thus is not necessarily dependent on the proce-
dural characteristics of case assignment" (whether individual or master calendar). M. SOLOMON,
CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN TRIAL CoURTs 29-30 (1973) (Supporting Study 2).
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be wasted."' 69
If the anticipated reduction in judicial case load materializes as a result of the
Hawaii mandatory arbitration program more judges should be available to han-
dle the cases that bypass arbitration-predominantly larger, more complex
cases. '6 In this projected setting, there is sound reason to believe that a master
calendar system can be adapted to achieve the efficiencies of managerial judges
in an assignment system."1"
In light of the potential administrative problems just discussed, the most
prudent approach for Hawaii courts may be to adopt rule 16 without the
mandatory aspect of the scheduling order. Rule 16, so modified, in conjunction
with rules 26(b)(1) and 26(f), would 'give judges significant power to control
the pretrial process without making active management mandatory. This would
forestall administrative difficulties, discussed above, while awaiting evaluation
and refinement of the mandatory scheduling order process by the federal or
'5 Peckham, A Judicial Response, supra note 7, at 257.
160 See supra note 39. Peter Adler, head of the Hawaii Supreme Court's Alternative Dispute
Resolution Program, estimates that with the legislatively imposed ceiling of $150,000, up to
ninety percent of all tort claims may be processed through arbitration. The program later plans to
expand to also encompass contract claims. Currently the arbitration program is in its fledgling
stage. Its ultimate impact on judicial case loads is still a matter of conjecture.
"' "Pretrial judges" could not only handle motions but also enter the initial scheduling orders
and establish parameters for discovery. This would provide pretrial continuity, with the judges
developing basic familiarity with the cases that bypass arbitration. These judges would also be in
a position to orchestrate early settlement-although a separate settlement judge would still be
used if needed. "Trial judges" would then be assigned as the cases go to trial, just as under the
present master calendar system. For flow charts of modified master calendar systems which en-
compass case management principles, see M. SOLOMON, supra note 158, at 16, 17.
A second option would be the "case flow manager" system used in the ELP experiment in the
Kentucky courts. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
Another option would be to keep the present system in place for simple cases and designate all
multi-party, discovery-intense cases "complex litigation" and assign those cases to judges early on.
The anticipated reduction in cases due to the mandatory arbitration program may allow for more
individual case assignments.
This would require revision to reinterpretation of Circuit Court rule 12(a)(I 1). Relatively few
cases are currently designated complex litigation. There are at least two apparent reasons. First,
the unofficial commentary to the rule cautions reluctance: "The court will not grant the motion
just because a case has multiple parties or issues, or involves a potentially substantial amount of
money." HAW. CIR. CT. R. 12(a)( 11) unofficial comment. Early assignment of a case will be made
"only when [the court] is satisfied an early assignment will effectuate the interests of judicial
economy and fairness to litigants," Id. Second, the parties must request the designation, and, as
discussed below, attorneys generally desire to control the pretrial process and do not often file
12(a)(I 1) motions. id.
The feasibility of these and other options for implementing new managerial rules requires
further study and discussion. It does appear, however, that any number of options would be
effective.
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other state courts.
B. New Rule 11-"Stop, Look, and Inquire"' '
New federal rule 11 gives the managerial judge a potent weapon for combat-
ing cost and delay arising out of groundless filings by eliminating the require-
ment of subjective bad faith for the imposition of sanctions and replacing it
with an objective "reasonableness" standard. The rule requires parties and their
attorneys to "stop, look and inquire" reasonably before asserting claims or de-
fenses or filing motions. Although the new federal rule has been in effect for
only three years, it's impact has been dramatic.' 63 Federal district and appellate
"' See Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule I I-Is the Stop, Look, and Investigate Requirement
a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REV. 751 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Reasonable Inquiry).
168 See McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cit. 1986) (sanctions upheld where suit
barred by collateral estoppel doctrine filed with intention to harass or to cause delay.); Reliance
Ins. Co. v. Sweeney Corp. 792 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (appellant and attorney sanctioned
for frivolous appeal after failing to cite any authority or reveal any facts underlying their position
and failing to respond to an order to show cause concerning sanctions); Eastway Constr. Corp. v.
City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (attorney's fees awarded to municipal defend-
ant in groundless antitrust and civil rights action); Norris v. Grosvenor Mktg., Ltd., 803 F.2d
1281 (2d Cir. 1986) (Second Circuit advised district court upon remand to exercise its "broad
discretion in fashioning sanctions" and grant defendant's request for [riule 11 sanctions in merit-
less breach of contract action barred by prior arbitration); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265
(2d Cit. 1986) (reversal of lower court award of attorney's fees to defendants in unconstitutional
arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution action; rule 11 limited to testing the attorney's
conduct at the time a paper is signed and does not impose a continuing obligation to the attor-
ney); Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986) (copyright infringement action
remanded to district court for articulation of reasons behind denial of award of attorney's fees);
Stephens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986) (order imposing rule
11 sanctions against plaintiff's counsel in declaratory judgment action on liability insurance policy
reversed as abuse of discretion because action "had a reasonable basis in fact and law and was not
objectively frivolous nor interposed for any improper purpose"); Cohen v. Virginia Elec. and
Power Co., 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986) (attorney's fees award affirmed because plaintiff's
motion for leave to amend was filed for improper purpose of determining whether defendant
would oppose it, with the intention of withdrawing the motion if opposed); Davis v. Veslan
Enter., 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cit. 1985) (attorney's fees imposed for undue delay against defendant
who filed removal petition after jury returned its verdict); Sites v. I.R.S., 793 F.2d 618 (5th Cir.
1986) (rule 11 sanctions appropriate where taxpayers' petitions to quash summons to their bank
were filed despite "longstanding, unequivocal, dispositive precedent rejecting taxpayer's claims");
Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cit. 1986) (district court's denial of attorney's fees
reversed as abuse of discretion where plaintiff's attorneys failed to conduct sufficient prefiling
investigation of the facts and the law underlying products liability claim); Frazier v. Cast, 771
F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1985) (order for rule 11 sanctions affirmed against attorney for asserting
factually baseless defense of exigent circumstances in civil rights action for warrantless entry of
home); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cit. 1985) (plaintiff's attor-
neys sanctioned for refusing to "recognize established law of the U.S. Supreme Court and this
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courts, although sometimes with differing interpretations,'" have enthusiasti-
cally embraced the new rule. "[Ihe message of [new) (r]ule 11 and of the
sanctions that have been imposed under (r]ule 11, is clear: 'don't waste the
court's or the opposing party's time.' "165
Former federal rule 11, which is identical to current Hawaii rule 11, proved
totally ineffective in preventing meritless filings. There are no reported cases of
sanctions under Hawaii rule 1 1.66 In the forty-five year history of the former
federal rule 11, only eleven reported cases found violations. 6 '
Circuit that defeated several of the plaintiff's claims"); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803
F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1986) (District Court of Hawaii's award of attorney's fees affirmed against
plaintiff for asserting mail fraud charges not "well grounded in fact" or "warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law");
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986) (order for rule
11 sanctions for "misleading" arguments in brief reversed; rule 11 construed as not imposing
upon district courts the burden of evaluating under ethical standards the accuracy of all lawyer's
arguments); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986) (order for sanctions
reversed where plaintiff's claim under Voting Rights Act had an objectively defensible legal basis
even though the claim ultimately failed); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (10th
Cir. 1985) (sanctions against defendant upheld where defendant agreed to a stipulated settlement
dismissing the case and then hired another attorney solely to delay the entry of the stipulated
dismissal through a groundless motion to set aside the settlement). The one Supreme Court case
mentioning new rule 11 is Bumett v. Grartan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 n.13 (1984) (noting that "the
administration of justice is not well-served by the filing of premature, hastily drawn complaints").
164 KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE II SANCTIONS xi (Federal Judicial Center 1985).
165 ABA SEc-ION OF LITIGATION, SANcnONS: RULE II AND OTHER POWERS 9 (1986) (empha-
sis original) [hereinafter SANCnONS].
'86 In response to continuing criticism of frivolous suits, the Hawaii legislature in 1980 and
again in 1986 passed legislation attempting to deter groundless actions. Unfortunately, neither
enactment is likely to achieve its goal.
In 1980 the legislature enacted section 607-14.5 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (artorneys'
fees in civil actions) authorizing courts to award attorneys' fees, as they "deem just" upon a
specific finding that "all claims by the party are completely frivolous and are totally unsupported
by the facts and the law." Act of June 17, 1980, ch. 286, 1980 Haw. Sess. Laws 547. The
statute is vague and extremely limited in scope. It only applies where all claims in the action are
"completely frivolous" (which is undefined) and have no basis at all in law and fact. It applies
only to "claims," including counterclaims. See Harada v. Ellis, 4 Haw. App. 439, 667 P.2d 834
(1983). It does not apply to defensive pleadings or motions. The award can be made only against
the plaintiff itself; plaintiff's attorney cannot be sanctioned.
In 1986, as a part of its tort reform package, the legislature authorized awards of attorneys'
fees for claims or defenses "not reasonably supported by law." HAW. REv. STAT. S 607-14.5
(Supp. 1986). Awards are not to exceed 25% of the amount claimed. This provision is poorly
crafted. If its aim is to deter ill-supported defenses as well as groundless claims, why is the ceiling
on fee awards determined in both instances by the amount of plaintiff's prayer? Why is frivolous-
ness defined only in terms of claims not reasonably supported by "law"? The law may initially
support a claim based on allegations which prove to be factually groundless. Ultimately, new rule
11, if adopted, may provide needed guidance on interpretations of this section.
167 See Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Fed-
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Under the former federal rule, a party or attorney's signature certified that he
had read the document filed and that "to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion and belief, there was good ground to support it."'6 8 An attorney could be
sanctioned only for "willful violations."'6 9 These provisions were consistently
interpreted to mean that an attorney could not be sanctioned if for whatever
reason he personally belie,,ed at the time that there was some good ground to
support his filing."' This subjective standard, requiring proof of bad faith,
failed to deter frivolous litigation. 1 ' Proof of what counsel actually believed at
the time presented an insurmountable hurdle in most instances, and judges
were reluctant to sanction attorneys who were not shown to be intentionally
abusing the system.
Rule 11 fell into disuse. Consequently, the federal rules were effectively de-
void of early screening or deterrent mechanisms for claims, defenses and mo-
tions which appeared plausible on paper but which upon reasonable investiga-
tion clearly lacked support in fact or law. Without early screening or deterrent
mechanisms attorneys were allowed to be fast and loose or at least careless in
their filings. Indeed, attorneys were subtly encouraged in that direction due to
the increased settlement leverage for the filing party-the cost to an opponent
responding to and attempting to defeat a groundless filing is often high. Attor-
neys vaguely defined public responsibilities as officers of the court were often
subsumed by their private obligations as zealous advocates for their clients.
In 1983, the Supreme Court and Congress responded by amending rule 11
to expand judicial powers to strike filings and impose disciplinary sanctions as
means for checking the filing of papers not reasonably supported by law or fact.
Deterrence was the stated rationale. One study found that some judges also
attributed compensatory and punitive purposes to the rule."7 2 Whether singular
or tripartite in purpose, the amended rule modestly increases the pre-filing in-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976). See also Amended Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How Go the Best Laid Plans, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1985).
168 id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938).
169 Id.
170 See, e.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Ramada Inns Sec.
Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Del. 1982).
171 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL S 1334 (1971). Under
the original version of rule 11, courts experienced considerable confusion as to:
(1) the circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or motion or taking discipli-
nary action,
(2) the standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign pleadings and motions, and
(3) the range of available and appropriate sanctions.
FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee note. See also RHODES, RIPPLE & MOONEY, SANCTIONS
IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 64-65 (Federal Judicial
Center 1981).
171 See KASSIN, supra note 164, at x.
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vestigative responsibilities of attorneys and parties and imposes mandatory sanc-
tions for unreasonable filings."" Awards of attorneys' fees against both parties
and their attorneys are intended to create an economic disincentive for careless
or abusive filings.
In practice, federal courts have tended to apply rule 11 in a straightforward
manner, avoiding uncertainty that might unfairly disrupt the way most attor-
neys practice. According to a survey of cases by the Federal Judicial Center
during the year following adoption of the new rule, although federal judges
imposed sanctions in a variety of situations, they imposed them predominantly
where filings were dearly careless or abusive. Representative cases include "the
filing of a claim after the statute of limitations had expired, or without subject
matter jurisdiction, and frivolous motions to disqualify defendant's attorney, for
summary judgment, or for a change of venue.'1 1 4 Recent federal court decisions
have also limited the scope of rule 11, addressing concerns that the rule not
impair fair access to the courts or impose undue burdens upon counsel.1 7 5
Under the new federal rule 11:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the
signer knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquity it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation. 1 6
The rule thus enunciates a new two-part standard for attorney performance: (1)
whenever he signs a pleading or motion he must have conducted reasonable
inquiry to determine whether the filing is "legally unreasonable or without fac-
tual foundation";7 7 and (2) whenever he signs a pleading or motion he is
certifying that it is not filed for a purpose that is "improper. "178
" Wiggin Speech, supra note 148, at 161. Judge Mansfield, Chairman of the Advisory
Committee commented that the primary purpose of the amendment to rule 11 was to "reduce
frivolous claims, defenses or motions" and to deter "costly meritless maneuvers." Letter from
Judge Mansfield, Chairman of the Advisory Committee to Judge Gignoux and the Members of
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 192 (1983). See
also Note, Reasonable Inquiry, supra note 162, at 751, 773 (1985).
174 KAss1N, supra note 164, at 6.
178 See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986); Golden Eagle Distrib.
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cit. 1986); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780
F.2d 823 (9th Cit. 1986).
176 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
17 Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830 (9th Cit. 1986).
178 See generally Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 802 F.2d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.), with-
drawn pending petition for reb'g, 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cit. 1986).
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1. Reasonable inquity requirement
The most significant change to rule 11 lies in the redefinition of the concept
of "frivolousness." The amended rule eliminates the subjective good faith test
of the original version and replaces it with an objective "reasonable inquiry"
standard.1 79 The Advisory Committee commented that the new "standard is
more stringent than the original good faith formula and thus it is expected that
a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation.-
180
One purpose of this new standard is to eliminate ignorance as an excuse for
the assertion of plainly unsubstantiable positions. 1 ' It does not matter who
performed the inquiry, but rather, "whether as a result the attorney has ade-
quate knowledge . . . sufficient to enable him to certify that the paper" is
reasonably supported.' 82 There is no longer allowance for a "pure heart, empty
head excuse."""
New rule 11 thus imposes an affirmative duty on the part of the attorney to
reasonably investigate the basis of the claim, defense or motion before filing.
Judicial inquiry on a rule 11 motion focuses on what investigative steps the
attorney took before certifying the filing. Whether the inquiry was "reasonable"
depends on the circumstances of each situation. Relevant factors include:
[Hiow much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to
1'79 Some courts have apparently persisted in applying a subjective bad faith standard. See, e.g.,
Suslick v. Rothchild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984) (award of attorney's fees denied
because no showing of subjective bad faith on part of plaintiff or her counsel where district court
all but invited plaintiff to resumit complaint on at least two occasions); Gieringer v. Silverman,
731 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1984) (attorney's fees denied to defendants where no showing of subjec-
tive bad faith on part of plaintiffs even though plaintiffs statements in depositions seemed to
indicate their sole purpose in bringing suit was to obtain settlement); Rubin v. Buckman, 727
F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1984) (district court on remand should give parties opportunity to present
submissions on bad faith issue in reconsidering defendants' request for attorney's fees).
18 Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829 (1986) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note).
Attorneys fees have been awardable under an objective reasonableness standard in civil rights
litigation. The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), entitles the prevailing
party to recovery of its attorneys fees. Where the defendant has prevailed, it must establish "that
the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought
in bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
181 See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
187 (1985).
I.. d. See generally Home-Pack Transport, Inc. v. Donovan, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1063, 1066
(D. Md. 1984) (counsel violated rule 11 by not making reasonable inquiry where motion had no
basis in law and was not submitted under time pressure even though counsel obtained oral advice
of other attorneys and acted in good faith).
183 KASSIN, supra note 164, at 5. Although the new Federal rule has stricken the requirement
of willfulness, it still remains a factor to be considered in determining the appropriate choice of
sanctions. See Wiggin Speech, supra note 148, at 178.
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rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or
other paper; whether the pleading, motion or other paper was based on a plausi-
ble view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another
member of the bar.
18 4
Thus the "reasonableness" standard embodied in rule 11 is flexible. It is in-
tended to accommodate the realities of law practice and not to impose unduly
onerous or unrealistic investigative burdens upon counsel.' 85
The following discussion addresses the two components of rule I1 's reasona-
ble inquiry standard: whether the filing is well-grounded in fact and whether it
is warranted by law or a good faith argument for change in the law. It then
addresses post-filing inquiry obligations and questions about the scope of the
reasonable inquiry requirement.
184 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. At least two federal district courts have identi-
fied the level and type of legal experience of counsel as a relevant factor. See, e.g., McQueen v.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 1967, No. C-1-84-1196 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 26, 1985)
(inquiry into expertise attorney may aid court in assessing reasonableness of counsel's conduct
under rule 11); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (sanctions appropriate where the two attorneys who signed the complaint had
seven and twelve years experience and held themselves out as labor law specialists, thus raising
strong inference that their bringing of action was for improper purpose).
"' How will judges actually account for the realities of law practice in the context of rule 11
standards? The answer touches upon several interrelated variables: the judge's commitment to rule
I I's purposes, the judge's perception of the demands of law practice and the judge's sense of
what was fair to have asked of the particular attorney in light of his experience and resources.
The Federal Judicial Center's study of judicial application of rule 11 standards yielded interest-
ing findings. The study was conducted shortly after the adoption of new rule 11, when judges
were in the initial stages of interpreting its provisions. The study found that judges tended to
apply a mixed subjective intent/objective reasonableness standard to certain types of cases. As a
result some good faith violations of the reasonableness standard elicited disciplinary action and
some did not. Kassin, supra note 164, at 27. Judges tended to sanction "simple negligence or
laziness more heavily than they do incompetence or lack of experience, despite their apparent
equivalence in implying the lack of bad faith." Id. Judges also tended to be more lenient in
imposing sanctions upon pro se litigants. This seems to imply that judges examine the reasons for
the groundless filing and determine whether the reasons are acceptable according to such factors as
the experience and resources of counsel (or the absence of counsel).
The study concluded that "the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 have apparently increased
judges' willingness to enforce the certification requirements." Id at 45. It also stated, however,
that judges in certain types of cases apply a modified objective standard to minimize the per-
ceived harshness of the pure objective standard: "judges rather naturally make distinctions within
the category of good faith violations. . (and] in the absence of bad faith only serious forms of
(unreasonable] misconduct appear to have resulted in the award of fees." Id. at 27. The study
suggests a four-tiered model describing judges' initial rulings under new rule 11.
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a. Well-grounded in fact
For most filings, reasonable factual inquiry includes thorough discussions
with the client and important witnesses1 8 6 and a review of available docu-
ments."' 7 Although rule 11 is designed to eliminate the "file first ask later"
approach, it does not require the equivalent of substantial discovery before fil-
ing. Where a party and attorney are unable to obtain important information
through informal investigation, they have discharged their duty of reasonable
inquiry. 88 It is the omission or misstatement of material fact, avoidable
through ordinary investigation, that is the focal point of the reasonable factual
inquiry requirement.
Uniod, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc."s9 illustrates the application of this
requirement. In Unjoil, plaintiffs brought a class action suit against several bro-
kerage houses and individuals alleging market manipulation of Unioil stock. 9"
Without investigation or inquiry, Joseph L. Alioto, plaintiff's counsel, improp-
erly named Zelezny, a stockbroker, as the class representative.191 Alioto had not
Four-Tiered Model Describing Judges' Rulings
on Rule 11 Motions for Sanctions
Qwacdizaion of Role I I Acual Decision Model
Attoey's Conu Prescriptions (%, Saino Gramnrd)
1. Nonviolation (pleading is reasonable under the circumstances) No sanctions No sanctions (29)
2. Nonwiliful good-faith violation (reasonableness standard not
met because of factors such as incompetence, lack of
experience, case complexity, and oversight) Sanctions Variable sanctions (61%)
3. Willful good-faith violation (reasonableness standard not met
because of personally controllable factors such as neglect or
laziness) Sanctions Sanctions (85%)
4. Willful bad-faith violation (reasonableness standard not met
because of willful disregard or misrepresentation of the facts
or law, or improper purpose) Sanctions Sanctions (98%)
186 Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1983) (personal interviews with
client and key witnesses).
5s7 Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Memorial Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.
Fla. 1984).
188 See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cit. 1986) (reasonableness of plaintiff's
factual inquiry must be assessed in light of the availability of relevant information); Mohammed
v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 262 (E.D. Mich. 1985). ("The difficulty of investi-
gating [antitrust claims] prior to the initiation of a lawsuit lessens the extent of investigative
efforts that an attorney must undertake to satisfy the 'reasonable inquiry' standard.")
s9 802 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.), withdrawn pending petition for reh'g, 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cit.
1986).
'9o Plaintiffs alleged a "concerted scheme to sell Unioil stock short in violation of federal
antitrust and securities laws, RICO, and various California laws." Unioil, 802 F.2d at 1084.
"s Based on Zelezny's deposition testimony, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
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contacted Zelezny prior to filing the complaint or conducted an independent
investigation, relying instead upon the reference of forwarding counsel.' Sub-
sequently, the district court dismissed the action and imposed sanctions under
rule 11 for failure to conduct reasonable inquiry. 9 ' Alioto appealed the imposi-
tion of sanctions.
Under the subjective standard of former federal rule 11 and current Hawaii
rule 11, only a willful violation would have subjected Alioto to sanctions. Thus,
unless the defendant could have shown that Alioto filed the complaint with the
knowledge that Zelezny was an improper class representative, sanctions would
have been inappropriate. Under the reasonable inquiry standard of the new rule,
however, Alioto's subjective intent was deemed irrelevant. The Ninth Circuit
found that Alioto failed to conduct reasonable investigation since a competent
attorney would have taken further steps prior to the filing of the lawsuit to
insure that the class claims were properly represented. 94
Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., illustrates the appropriateness of sanctions for
motions not well-grounded in fact.' 9" The court sanctioned defense counsel for
filing an unreasonable motion for summary judgment, finding that "although
the defendants acted in subjective good faith in moving for summary judgment,
there was no objective basis for the attorney to conclude that the motion was
well-grounded as the questions of fact were obvious.'"" Implicit in the court's
decision were concerns about undue expense to the plaintiff, unnecessary time
burdens on the court and improper use of the summary judgment motion as a
discovery shortcut.
finding that Zelezny's claims clearly were not typical of those of the class and that Zelezny's
apparent conflicting interest class members' interests dearly made him "inadequate" as a class
representative. Id. at 552, 558.
"' The Ninth Circuit deemed not dearly erroneous the district court's findings that (1) Alioto
had reason to know that Zelezny was the only named plaintiff who appeared to be independent
of Unioil, (2) Alioto knew virtually nothing about forwarding counsel on his inquiry into
Zelezny's suitability as a class representative, (3) Alioto's firm represented itself as experienced in
complex business litigation, (4) Alioto had ample time to investigate before filing, (5) no severe
time or monetary constraints impeded any investigation, and (6) the class of allegations
threatened defendants with mass liability and aroused a vigorous and costly defense. Id. at 557.
113 The district court also found plaintiffs counsel in violation of rule 11 for: (1) attempting
to disengage from class discovery without cause and from the class action suit without court
approval; and (2) failure to comply with the requirements for statements under oath. Id. at 553.
' Id. at 558-59. Cf. Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (court applied what amounted to the reasonable inquiry standard to find a
violation under old rule 11).
isa 101 F.R.D. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
190 See id. See also SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 102 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (sanc-
tions imposed for groundless summary judgment motions).
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b. Warranted by law or a good faith argument for a change in law
Rule 11 also requires reasonable inquiry to determine whether the filing is
warranted by law or a good faith argument for a change in the law. Although
the Ninth Circuit recently held that rule 11 and the ethical rules are not coex-
tensive, 9 " rule 11 does address a problem with ethical as well as practical
dimensions: the assertion in court of a position lacking any plausible legal basis.
Thus an attorney's duty of zealous client representation does not abrogate her
obligation not to misrepresent the law to the court.
In a case providing important guidance for Hawaii attorneys, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles 9 ' delineated the standard for determin-
ing whether a pleading or motion is warranted by law. In Zaldivar, plaintiffs
asserted that defendant's failure to distribute a bilingual recall notice constituted
a violation of the Federal Voting Rights Act.199 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment against plaintiffs, holding that the Act was inapplicable because
it did not apply to conduct of private individuals and because it applied only to
"acts of voting" and a recall notice is not an act of voting. 0 0 Subsequently, the
district court sanctioned plaintiffs under rule 11, finding plaintiffs' claims "friv-
olous" and "totally without merit." ' ' The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed
the imposition of sanctions.
The Ninth Circuit noted that under rule II's "warranted by law" require-
ment, the pleader "need not be correct in his view of the law;" rather, "at a
minimum, [the pleader based on reasonable inquiry) must have a good faith
argument for his or her view of what the law should be.'"'22 The court con-
duded that sanctions under rule 11 were inappropriate since plaintiffs had ad-
vanced the plausible argument that the literal provisions of the Voting Rights
Act were to be expansively construed to effect the strong remedial purposes of
the Act. In light of legislative history and expansive judicial construction of
analogous provisions, the court found the legal basis of plaintiffs' position objec-
tively defensible, even though that position ultimately failed.20 3
"' Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
198 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
", Id. at 825-27. Plaintiffs filed an action in federal district court to enjoin the City of Los
Angeles from processing defendants' recall petitions. Id. at 826.
200 Id. at 827.
101 id. See also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
, Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 827.
.os Id. at 834. The Ninth Circuit recognized the Advisory Committee's mandate that courts
are expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by
inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was
submitted. See FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee note. See also, Davis v. Veslan Enter., 765
F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985) (assertion must be based on a plausible view of the law); Eastway
Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (Where it is patently clear that
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In contrast, the plaintiff's claims in Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.20 4
lacked an objectively defensible legal basis, and were therefore sanctionable. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of "counsel's incompetence
in the handling of this matter by making 'frivolous' and 'worthless' claims, ' 2 0 5
noting that "counsel has refused to recognize or to grapple with the established
law of the [United States) Supreme Court and of this Circuit that defeats sev-
eral of the claims.' -20
Advocacy of positions foreclosed by prevailing precedent does not in all situa-
tions constitute a rule 11 violation. "[G]ood faith argument[s] for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law ' 20 7 fall squarely within the
bounds of permissible conduct. All arguments for changes in law, however, do
not pass rule 11 muster. A new legal theory or an argument for reversal of
existing law must be made in "good faith."-2 0 8 This good faith standard is a
marked departure from the subjective intent standard of former rule 11. "Good
faith arguments" are to be measured objectively: Did counsel through reasona-
ble inquiry have any reasonable basis for his arguments for a change of law?2" 9
Counsel's arguments need not bear a high probability of success so long as they
are objectively defensible;210 that is, they have a plausible basis in developing




The reasonableness requirement in new rule I I is tested at the time of filing.
Judicial debate exists, however, as to whether the duty of reasonable inquiry
continues after initial filing. The Fifth Circuit in Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd.
v. McMullan,"' held that counsel had a continuing obligation under rule 11 to
a claim has absolutely no chance of success under existing precedents, and where no reasonable
argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands, rule 11 is violated.).
204 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
205 Id. at 206.
204 Id. at 205.
207 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
208 Id.
200 See Easrway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985). For a
discussion of rule Il 's potential for chilling vigorous advocacy see infra text accompanying notes
244-49.
210 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
211 See Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 324 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
Rule 11 Dynamics).
212 801 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986). In Southern Leasing, the district court imposed sanctions
under rule 11 for the filing of an action which was later dismissed on res judicata grounds. Id. at
787. The court held that reasonable inquiry, pre or post-filing, would have revealed the impropri-
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review, reexamine, and reevaluate his position as the facts came to light after
initial filing. This position is generally consistent with the rule's ultimate goal of
deterring litigation over meritless positions. It tends, however, to impose oner-
ous monitoring burdens on counsel.
In light of the reasonableness calculus which attempts to balance burdens and
benefits, the Second Circuit's position in Oliveri v. Thompson213 seems more
sensible. The court in Oliveri held that "[rjule 11 applies only to the initial
signing of a 'pleading, motion, or other paper.' -214 Concerned about overbur-
dening attorneys, the court concluded that under rule 11 an attorney does not
have a continuing obligation to monitor the validity of the position advocated.
This is consistent with the Advisory Committee comments which focus inquiry
on the attorney's conduct solely at the time of "submission.' '215
d. Scope of reasonable inquiry requirement
Disagreement also exists about the scope of rule 11 's reasonable inquiry re-
quirement. Must every allegation in a complaint (or every argument in a mo-
tion) fail the reasonable inquiry test before rule 11 is violated? Or does an
"unreasonable" claim (or argument) in an otherwise well-grounded filing consti-
tute a rule 11 violation as to the unreasonable part?
The Ninth Circuit recently held that the entire "pleading, motion, or other
paper" must fail the reasonable inquiry test."' 6 A pleader might therefore, with
impunity, allege one plausible claim and join with it ten groundless claims. The
opposing party's cost of defeating those ten claims goes unreimbursed and con-
siderable court time is consumed. The pleader is encouraged to over-plead be-
cause of the additional initial settlement leverage. The Seventh Circuit has
adopted what appears to be a better approach. Even though some of the asser-
tions in a filed document satisfy the reasonable inquiry standard, those that do
ety of the claim. Id. at 789. See also Woodfork v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100 (N.D. Miss. 1985)
(attorney obligated to reevaluate earlier certification of case under rule II if he subsequently learns
of information of evidence which reasonably leads him to believe there is no factual or legal basis
for his position); Smith v. United Transp. Union Local 81, 594 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Cal. 1984)
(rule 11 sanctions appropriate where attorneys raised affirmative defenses previously stricken by
the court and obviously ignored relevant law subsequently brought to their attention by
plaintiffs).
213 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986). In Oliveri, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
order to impose sanctions under rule 11 for plaintiff's failure to dismiss civil rights claims after
discovery indicated that the claims were tenuous. Id. at 1281.
214 id. at 1274.
215 See supra note 203.
216 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986).
("The Rule permits the imposition of sanctions only when the 'pleading, motion, or other paper'
itself is frivolous, not when one of the arguments in support . . . is frivolous.").
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not trigger rule 11 sanctions."' This approach better addresses the problem of
undue litigant and court costs arising out of the shotgun method of litigating.
2. Improper purpose test
The second part of the rule 11 certification requirement concerns improper
purposes. Sanctions are warranted if the pleading or motion is filed for an "im-
proper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or needless
increase in the cost of litigation."2 1 This provision addresses the problem of
"misusing judicial procedures for personal or economic harassment."29
Although an "improper purpose" test suggests an examination into subjec-
tive intent, several federal courts of appeal have steadfastly rejected this no-
tion.22 Instead, courts inquired into whether the signer's actions under the
circumstances, as objectively measured, manifested a desire to harass or delay.22
The focus is not on the actual consequences of the signer's act, and it is not
enough that the filings "bother, annoy or vex the complaining party."22
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hand..3 is illustrative. The defendant's initial counsel
negotiated a favorable settlement on defendant's behalf.2 24 Attorneys for the
parties filed a "stipulation and dismissal" that ended the suit and severed the
supply/purchase business relationship of the parties.2  Defendant, however,
hired another attorney solely, it appears, to delay effectuation of the stipulation
"1 Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) (The failure of
"several" but not all of plaintiff's claims to satisfy the reasonable inquiry standard constituted a
rule II violation.). See alo Mohammed v. Union Carbide, 606 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(Rule 11 sanctions imposed for lack of reasonable prefiling inquiry in defamation claim, even
though reasonable inquiry had been conducted on complex antitrust claim.); Florida Monument
Builders v. All Faiths Mem. Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (entire pleading need
not be frivolous to trigger rule 11 sanctions).
218 See FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee note.
219 Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1537.
120 See, e.g., Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985);
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
21 According to Judge Schwarzer:
In considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper purpose, the court need
not delve into the attorney's subjective intent. The record in the case and all of the sur-
rounding circumstances should afford an adequate basis for determining whether particular
papers or proceedings caused delay that was unnecessary, whether they caused increase in
the costs of litigation that was needless, or whether they lacked any apparent legitimate
purpose.
Schwarzer, rupra note 181, at 195.
222 Id.
223 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985).
224 Id. at 1186.
225 Id.
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and dismissal until defendant could "find another source of supply.''26 That
new attorney filed a rule 60(b) motion challenging the stipulation."' The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the motion was filed for the
purpose of delay and was therefore in violation of the second prong of rule
11.228
In Zaldivar,"2 ' the Ninth Circuit wrestled with the issue of whether a com-
plaint well-grounded in fact and law may, nevertheless, violate rule 11 because
it was filed for an "improper purpose." ' The court found that since rule 11
provides that a filing must be "well grounded in fact and . . .warranted by
existing law . . . and (must not be] interposed for any improper purpose,"
the two clauses operate independently and the violation of either constitutes a
violation of the rule.2 3 ' The court declined to decide in general principle when a
properly grounded pleading or motion might still constitute impermissible har-
assment. Focusing on the specific facts of Zaldivar and implicitly on fair access
concerns, the court articulated a principle narrowly limited to the filing of com-
plaints, concluding that a single complaint which complies with the well-
grounded-in-fact and warranted-by-law dauses cannot constitute impermissible
harassment, regardless of the motivation for its filing.2 32
The court did, however, outline two scenarios where otherwise proper filings
might be deemed sanctionable harassment. The court noted that the "filing of
excessive motions . . .even if each is well grounded in fact and law, may
under particular circumstances be 'harassment' under [r]ule l."23 The court
also indicated that the "filing of [an] action in federal court, after the rejection
in state court of its legal premise" might constitute harassment "under the
second prong" of rule 11, provided that there "exists] an identity of parties
involved in the successive claims, and a clear indication that the proposition
urged in the second claim was resolved in the earlier one.' '23
3. Mandatory sanctions
Once a court finds a violation of rule 11, "the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, or represented
226 Id.
227 Id.
226 Id. at 1187.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 188-193.
"o Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832. ("In short, may an attorney be sanctioned for doing what the
law allows, if the attorney's motive for doing so is improper?")
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 832 n.10.
234 id. at 834.
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party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the
other party . . . the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing . . . including a reasonable attorney's fee." '85 New rule 11 thus explic-
itly mandates the imposition of sanctions once the rule's standards have been
violated.28 0
Judges retain considerable discretion in fashioning appropriate sanctions.2" 7
A court is not limited in its selection. The most common sanction is an assess-
ment of the opposing party's reasonable costs, including attorney's fees.2 38 Sanc-
tions are usually imposed upon the attorney, although parties also have been
penalized.
There is one cautionary note. Rule 11 is not intended to shift to the loser the
burden of the prevailing party's attorney's fees whenever a complaint is dis-
missed or a motion is denied. Sanctions flow only from transgressions of rule 11
standards. A motion for sanctions that fails the reasonable inquiry test is itself
subject to rule 1 1 sanctions.23 9
4. Standards of appellate review
Appellate review has become an important element of judicial efforts to clar-
ify rule 11 standards. Conceptually, the standard of appellate review of rule 11
decisions is divided into three degrees of deference. First, de novo review is
appropriate if the dispute centers upon the legal conclusion that the uncontro-
verted facts constituted a violation of rule I L"' Second, if the facts relied upon
by the court are disputed on appeal, review is appropriate under the rule 52(a)
clearly erroneous standard. 2 4' Finally, the abuse of discretion standard is appli-
cable to challenges to the appropriateness of the type and extent of the
235 FED. R. Civ. P. II (emphasis added).
23' The intent of mandatory sanctions is to reduce judicial reluctance to impose sanctions on
violators. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note; Comment, Prescriptions, supra note 41,
at 892.
2" The Advisory Committee notes that under the new rule, "(t]he court . . . retains the
necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has discretion to tailor
sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be well acquainted." FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
In determining the appropriate sanction, courts should consider: (1) the gravity and impact of
the violation; (2) the need for general deterrence; and (3) the need for punishment. See Schwarzer,
supra note 221, at 200-201.
238 See Kassin, supra note 164, at xi.
... See Anderson v. Pepsi Cola Metro. Bottling Co., No. 84-CV-8144-FL (E.D. Mich., Feb. 1,
1985); Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 991 (N.D. Il1. 1984).
140 Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1538.
"" Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 828.
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sanctions.""
5. Concerns over the adoption of new rule 11
In expanding judicial power and establishing more stringent standards for
attorney performance, Congress and the Supreme Court intended to minimize
unreasonable filings thereby decreasing "delay and expense in civil proceed-
ings."24 A potential side effect of rule 1 1 is that it might deter development of
creative or new legal theories. 44 Commentators worry that access to the judicial
process might be severely curtailed, especially for the disadvantaged and politi-
cally powerless groups who have traditionally based their claims upon novel
legal theories. Indeed, a rule that inhibits fair participation or prevents the effec-
tuation of substantive rights, no matter how efficient in operation, would be
unacceptable.
Judges applying new rule 11 must be sensitive to these potential pitfalls. The
drafters of new rule 1 1 were, and they therefore specifically built into the rule
flexibility to allow for the filing of creative or novel legal theories.245 Under the
rule, sanctions for "legally unreasonable" filings are appropriate only when the
legal position asserted has no chance of success under existing precedents and
when no reasonable argument can be made to extend, modify, or reverse ex-
isting law. 4 6 Recognizing the importance of access for people with potentially
meritorious although unconventional claims or novel defenses, the comments to
242 Id. See also Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cit. 1985). This conceptual
construct is of course subject to judicial alteration in practice. The degree of judicial deference
actually accorded and the reasons therefor are complex matters beyond the scope of this article.
242 See Carter, The History and Purpose of Rule 1i, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4 (1986). See gener-
ally Schwarzer, supra note 41.
244 See, e.g., Weiss, A Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use of Amended Rule II, 54
FORDHAm L. REV. 23 (1985). See also Resnik, supra note 61.
242 See Note, Rule I1 Dynamics, supra note 211, at 324. ("Rule 11 was not intended to
penalize advocates of unpopular causes. Indeed, the 'argument to change the law' clause should
be interpreted as an incentive to litigate colorable, albeit novel claims.").
248 Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (1985). In Eastway, the Second
Circuit Court noted that:
In framing this standard, we do not intend to stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity
that is the very lifeblood of the law. Vital changes have been wrought by those members
of the bar who have dared to challenge the received wisdom, and a rule that penalized
such innovation and industry would run counter to our notions of the common law it-
self. . . . [W]here it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success
under existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend,
modify, or reverse the law as it stands, Rule 11 has been violated.
Id. at 254. See also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986); Fraizer v.
Cast, 771 F.2d 259 (7th Cit. 1985); Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir.
1985).
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the amended rule specifically note that rule 11 is not meant to "chill an attor-
ney's enthusiasm or creativity."""
The judicially-developed "objectively defensible" test for legal reasonableness
set forth in Zaldivar,4 8 and the "no reasonable argument" standard for exten-
sions or modifications of existing law should therefore be applied within the
context of the Advisory Committee's mandate to avoid chilling attorney creativ-
ity. Together, they provide solid judicial guidance for protecting litigants with
novel positions plausibly connected with social and legal developments.2 49
Another concern is the possibly disproportionate impact of the new rule upon
plaintiffs. In every case, rule lI's initial impact will be upon the plaintiff who is
deciding whether or not to sue. The overall impact of the rule, however, along
with its discovery counterparts 26(g) and 26(b)(1)(iii), should be more or less
evenly felt by plaintiffs and defendants. Defendants will be constrained in filing
counterclaims, many of which are filed to gain leverage, and in asserting
groundless defenses. Defendants will also have to think twice about filing mo-
tions to dismiss or for summary judgment that are intended merely to pressure
plaintiffs or to flush out plaintiffs' legal theories.
2 5 0
Particularly significant from a plaintiff's perspective is the impact of rule
26(g), the discovery rule counterpart of rule 11. As discussed below, rule 26(g)
proscribes "unreasonable" discovery requests, responses, and objections. In addi-
tion, rule 26(b)(1)(iii) authorizes the judge at the outset to limit discovery rea-
sonably according to the needs of the case and the resources of the parties. The
managerial judge, collectively employing these rules, can provide a significant
measure of protection for plaintiffs from litigation excesses, especially in multi-
ple defendant cases.
The absence of definitive studies or a solid body of federal court experience
on the impact of rule 11 counsels caution in application and continuing scru-
tiny. The design of rule I1 's drafters and judicial sensitivity to date, as exempli-
fied in Zaldivar, however, indicate that rule I1 's ultimate impact will not be
the chilling of novel legal theories or the unfair burdening of plaintiffs or de-
fendants. Its ultimate impact may well be the elimination of careless or
thoughtless filings and filings by persons using the courts simply to vent their
nonlegal grievances. Restricting access for the former is appropriate for obvious
reasons. Restricting access for the latter is appropriate because lengthy ground-
less actions, however emotionally gratifying, are expensive in terms of the
judge's and the litigants' time and ultimately preclude others from timely access
247 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note (1983).
248 See supra text accompanying notes 188-193.
, For a further discussion of the impact of the new rules on fair access to the judicial process,
see supra text accompanying notes 119-25 and infra text accompanying notes 281-82.
250 See, e.g., Wells v. Oppenheimer, 101 F.R.D. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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to the judicial process. The United States Supreme Court recently commented:
(W]hile freedom and access to the court is indeed a cherished value, every misuse
of any court's time impinges on the right of other litigants with valid or at least
arguable claims to gain access to the judicial process. The time this Court expends
examining and processing frivolous applications is very substantial, and that time
could be devoted to considering claims which merit consideration.
2 51
A final concern is that new rule 11 might lead to protracted and expensive
satellite litigation.25 Considerable litigation has arisen in federal courts.2 5 3 The
Advisory Committee anticipated litigation clarifying rule 11 standardds ini-
tially. Such questions as the nexus between rule I I and the ethical rules need
addressing.25 4 It also predicted that as a body of law developed, litigation
would subside. Clear guidance and strong initial enforcement should encourage
confirmance and reduce the need for sanctions in future cases. The committee
believed that the increased management efficiency of the district courts resulting
from rule 1 1 would outweigh the initial burdens of ancillary litigation.25 5 This
should be especially true for the Hawaii courts if new rule 11 is adopted. By
the time new rule 1 1 is adopted in Hawaii, a substantial body of federal cases
will exist to guide Hawaii judges.256
5' Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067 (1985).
2.2 See, e.g., Unioil Inc. v. E.F. Hutton, 802 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986); Golden Eagle Dis-
tributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986). See generally Weiss, u'pra
note 244.
25 See supra note 163.
"' The Ninth Circuit recently clarified the nexus between rule 11 and the ethical rules. See
Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986). In Golden
Eagle, the court held that an attorney's violation of the ethical rules for failing to cite contrary
authority does not constitute a violation of rule II. Nor is rule 11 violated when an attorney
"misleads" the court by implying that his legal position is based on existing law when it is based
instead on a good faith argument for a change in the law. Rule 11 does not require counsel to
specify whether his argument is based on existing law or an argument for change. Id. at 1540.
Focusing on the text of Rule II and problems of judicial administration, the court articulated a
general principle separating rule 11 from the ethical rules: "Rule II . . . does not impose upon
the . . . courts the burden of evaluating under ethical standards the accuracy of all lawyers'
arguments." Id. at 1542.
s See Wiggin Speech, supra note 248, at 161.
288 The ABA Section of Litigation has offered "Practical Suggestions to Avoid Rule II Sanc-
tions." Those general suggestions, omitting citations, bear repeating:
(1) Recognize that your subjective good faith in filing the pleading is not enough to avoid
sanctions.
(2) Confirm that your pleading is not designed to harass the adversary or to delay or
extend the cost of the proceeding, and remember that the objective circumstances of the
litigation will probably determine whether there has been an improper purpose.
(3) Conduct a thorough personal interview with your client and key witnesses about the
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C. Limiting discovery without stifling reasonable case development-new rules
26(b)(1), 260 & 2 6 (g)
Increasing attention has focused on the collision between the liberal truth-
seeking spirit of the discovery rules and the unreasonable cost of "doing discov-
ery" over the last ten years.25 Although much of the concern has been directed
toward larger case litigation, the discovery process in moderate-sized cases has
also been criticized. New federal rules 26(b)(1), 26(f) and 26 (g) significantly
expand the powers of the managerial judge to control discovery from the outset
of the litigation. These new rules, which are interwoven into new rule 16, at-
tempt to direct the managerial judge to seek an accommodation of competing
concerns by allowing for discovery of relevant information without permitting
disproportionate cost.
The 1980 and 1983 amendments to rule 26 are designed to achieve this
accommodation in four ways. The amendments (1) limit the scope of discovery
on the basis of practical concerns never before recognized in the traditional ad-
versarial system; (2) establish the discovery conference as a tool of the manage-
rial judge; (3) require attorney certification of the "reasonableness" of discovery
requests, responses and objections; and (4) specify sanctions for noncompliance.
pleading.
(4) Review pertinent documents that may support pleading.
(5) If the facts supporting the pleading are available without discovery, greater factual
certainty is required.
(6) If the facts are available only through discovery, evaluate proof available from your
client and make a reasonable assessment of the proof likely from the adversary.
(7) Make your own personal assessment of legal issues such as jurisdiction and venue and
of defenses which might bar the claim, such as statute of limitations.
(8) If you are not experienced in the given field (for example, anti-trust law or RICO
claims), make an informed decision as to the validity of the claim or defense, or at the
very least get an independent opinion from an experienced practitioner. You must bring
some experience to bear on the issues before invoking the federal court system. Be aware,
however, that reliance upon other counsel on fundamental questions of the law (as opposed
to the facts) has resulted in sanctions.
(9) In writing your briefs, confirm that your legal theories are supported by existing law,
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. It is
entirely appropriate to urge that existing law be changed. In fact, vigorous representation
of your client requires such an approach. However, if your argument seeks a change of
existing law, make it clear to the court in your brief what your position is and do not
delude the court as to the actual state of the law.
(10) If you must file a pleading hurriedly to avoid a time bar, do so and promptly thereaf-
ter carry out the foregoing suggestions.
(11) If you are local counsel, do not sign the pleading or motion unless you have deter-
mined that Rule 11 has been complied with by lead counsel.
SANCrIONS, rupra note 165, at 9-11 (emphasis added).
287 See infra note 305.
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The original version of rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and
its current Hawaii counterpart) provided that unless the court ordered other-
wise, "the frequency of use [of the methods of discovery] . . . is not lim-
ited.''. This language embodied a policy favoring unlimited discovery in
search of relevant information. In the seminal case on the scope of discovery,
Hickman v. Taylor,2"9 the Supreme Court affirmed this policy of broad discov-
ery. The original rules contemplated attorney implementation of this policy with
minimal judicial involvement. The Advisory Committee noted, as late as 1970,
that the discovery rules were "designed to encourage extra judicial discovery
with a minimum of judicial intervention.- 260
This self-regulating system, however, proved unworkable. Attorneys learned
and were ultimately compelled to manipulate the discovery process to their cli-
ent's advantage, resulting in widespread uneconomical overuse of the rules.
26 1
There is a very real concern in the legal community that the discovery process is
now being overused. Wild fishing expeditions, since any material which might
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is discoverable, seem to be the norm.
Unnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high cost to litigants,
and the correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as a lever toward
settlement have come to be part of some lawyers' trial strategy.26
2
The original federal rules and the current Hawaii rules assumed collective
attorney loyalty to the system and inherent market constraints as means for
avoiding overuse of the discovery rules. Supervision and enforcement mecha-
258 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
259 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). ("Civil trials no longer need be carried on in the dark ....
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation.")
230 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee note.
281 The focus on "overuse" of discovery machinery should be distinguished from violations of
specific discovery rules.
While there are instances in which lawyers make improper discovery requests under the
rules or resist information that is clearly discoverable, it is suggested that this does not
represent the critical problem with the discovery process. The most significant discovery
problem is that the tools are so vast and the scope so broad that even obtaining the
information to which a party is legitimately entitled under the rules has become a waste-
ful, time-consuming, dilatory, and expensive process.
Existing rule 37 provides sanctions for violations of specific discovery rules but does not address
the problem of "overuse." rule 26(c) authorizes protective orders "for good cause shown" to
prevent "undue burden or expense" but only becomes operative at the pohilt of crisis-when a
party is imminently threatened. It does not facilitate planning reasonably to limit discovery. Thus
existing rules do not address the probl.em of potential "overuse" as viewed from the commence-
ment of the case.
2"2 See Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System In
the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978).
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nisms were woefully weak.2 6 3 These assumptions proved unrealistic, especially
for larger cases. 26 4 The new rules are more pragmatic. The real.ty is that an
attorney's allegiance lies first and foremost with her clients. The canon of ethics
requires it.2 6 5 Business practicalities encourage it. Zealousness in representation
readily translates into strategic use of opportunities allowed by the rules."66
Given this firmly entrenched mind-set, with its underpinnings in the ethical
code, and litigants' demands for hard-nosed litigators, the new rules acknowl-
edge that it is unrealistic to expect all attorneys to voluntarily and consistently
restrain themselves against misusing the opportunities provided by the
system.267
New rule 26 demands attorneys' concomitant allegiance to the welfare of the
system and everyone affected by it. It gives the managerial judge greater power
to shape and control discovery. Indeed, the "is not limited" policy of former
rule 26(a) has been replaced with a radically different policy. The new provi-
sions are intended "to encourage district judges to identify instances of needless
... See Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules and Practices In View of Proposed
Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REv. 253 (1979).
'" Many cases are litigated without discovery disputes. However, even attorneys who prefer to
minimize discovery struggles tend to perceive their allegiance to their clients to include strategic
overuse of the discovery rules. Professor Brazil's study found:
Our data portrays a system permeated with subtle and overt forms of resistance, a system
whose tools often are used inartfully or as a means to exert pressure on or secure some
tactical advantage over an opponent. This thoroughly adversarial process is inefficient and
expensive. It also fails to achieve its primary purpose: to assure "mutual knowledge of all
the relevant facts gathered by both parties [that] is essential to proper litigation."
Brazil, supra note 33 at 881.
,65 See, e.g., HAW. C.P.R. Canon 7.
26 Hawaii experience indicates that although attorneys are generally cooperative, client alle-
giance and concern about malpractice compels many attorneys to overuse discovery mechanisms.
Civil administrative judge for the First Circuit Court, Philip Chun, observed:
I think, perhaps, sometimes discovery is being abused. The parties want too much.
They're "out fishing," but you have to look at it on a case-to-case basis. I don't think you
can make the general statement that discovery is being abused, because definitely, with all
the litigation we have now, if an attorney does not do his discovery, he is subject to
malpractice.
So you're stuck. You have to attempt to do the discovery and that's why, lots of times,
it ends up before us as to whether or not that is discoverable.
Interview with Judge Philip Chun and Judge Edwin Honda, 19 HAW. BJ. 117, 130 (1985).
... As one litigator commented:
Requiring that a lawyer either exercise restraints in carrying out discovery on his client's
behalf or be sanctioned, interferes with the attorney's obligation of undivided allegiance to
his client. The full parties' action of a lawyer in his role as partisan advocate touches "the
integrity of the adjudicative process itself."
Fishbein, New Federal Rule 26: A Litigator's Perpective, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 739, 746 (1983).
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discovery and to limit the use of various discovery devices accordingly." 2"8
1. Rule 26(b)(1)
The conceptual centerpiece is amended rule 26(b)(1). The rule rejects three
traditional notions of procedural fairness: first, that "more is better";269 second,
that "procedural neutrality" in the positivist sense means that rules must treat
all parties as if they are on equal footing (even if they are not);27 and third,
that all issues are created equal in importance.17 1 In rejecting these notions, rule
26(b)(1) acknowledges that outcomes are altered and the quality of justice is
often impacted by the burden and expense of the parties' "permissible" use of
discovery devices. 2
The amended rule 26(b)(1) is therefore designed to "prevent use of discovery
to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a party, whether financially
weak or affluent.' '27 3 It encourages judges to limit discovery before disputes
arise. The managerial judge is authorized to limit discovery under 26(b)(1)
upon motion by a party or on his own accord." 4 This provision therefore com-
plements rule 16's provisions concerning scheduling and pretrial conferences.2 5
During those conferences the judge can exercise his 26(b)(1) authority to set
discovery timetables and limit the scope of permissible discovery.
The first two subsections of rule 26(b)(1) authorize judges to limit discovery
for commonly accepted reasons-if the discovery contemplated would be "cu-
mulative or duplicative' '276 or could be obtained in a less burdensome man-
ner.2 7 7 In contrast, the third subsection, 26(b)(1)(iii), is striking in its original-
ity. It articulates significant values often implicitly acknowledged by judges in
268 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note.
26 See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
270 See rupra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
271 Id.
271 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
273 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee note.
274 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
275 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(3) (discouraging wasteful pretrial activities); FED R. Civ. P.
16(b)(3) (time limits for discovery); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)( 11) (other matters as may aid in
disposition).
276 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(i).
277 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l)(ii). The Advisory Committee noted:
The first element of this standard, Rule 26(b)(1)(i), is designed to minimize redun-
dancy in discovery and encourage attorneys to be sensitive to the comparative costs of
different methods of securing information. Subdivision (b)(1)(ii) also seeks to reduce re-
petitiveness and to oblige lawyers to think through their discovery activities in advance so
that full utilization is made of each deposition, document request, or set of interrogatories.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note.
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their rulings but never formally recognized in the adversarial process. Rule
26(b)(1)(iii) addresses the problem of over-discovery by establishing the princi-
ple of "proportionality."278 The quest for relevant information is to be tem-
pered by considerations of burden and expense. "Undue burden and expense"
are to be measured by taking account of "the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy," the "importance of the issues at stake," and the "limitations on
the parties' resources. "279
This last factor is particularly significant because the federal rules have finally
acknowledged that the extent of a party's litigation resources can materially
affect the outcome of a case. All parties are not created equal, and financial
inequality and liberal discovery opportunities often combine to distort fair re-
sults. Thus, in limiting discovery under rule 26(b)(l)(iii), a judge is to consider
the discovery needs of the case in light of the amount in controversy and "the
limitations on a financially weak litigant to withstand extensive opposition to a
discovery program or to respond to discovery requests. "280
The cost reduction goal of 26(b)(l)(iii)'s proportionality principle is intended
to benefit directly litigants and the court and ultimately the general public.
Applied conscientiously over time, rule 26(b)(l)(iii) should also have the salu-
tary effect of expanding access opportunities to middle income litigants as well
as the poor and politically powerless who may have only the courts for recourse
against injustice. 281
278 In drafting the amended discovery rules the Judicial Conference determined that over dis-
covery "results in excessively costly and time-consuming activities that are disproportionate to the
nature of the case, the amount involved, or the issues at stake." Committee on Rules of Practice
& Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Fed. R. Civ. P. June 1981), 90 F.R.D. 451, 481 (1981) thereinafter Commit-
tee on Rules.).
279 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(I)(iii). The Advisory Committee notes state:
The elements of Rule 26(b)(I)(iii) address the problem of discovery that is disproportion-
ate to the individual lawsuit as measured by such matters as its nature and complexity, the
importance of issues at stake in a case seeking damages, the limitations on a financially
weak litigant to withstand extensive opposition to a discovery program or to respond to
discovery requests, and the significance of the substantive issues, as measured in philo-
sophic, social, or institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public
policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee note.
280 Id.
281 Poor people and politically powerless minority groups are usually represented, if at all, by
public interest law organizations. Those organizations generally have severely limited litigation
budgets. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (calling for a
'more searching judicial inquiry" in his much-discussed footnote, Chief Justice Stone cited the
precarious political position of "discrete and insular minorities" in a democratic society as distin-
guished from those with access to the political process"). See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
University of Hawaii Lau, Review / Vol. 9:395
Rule 26(b)(1) in general, and subsection (iii) in particular, also serve as a
nice counterbalance to rule 11. Although, as discussed earlier,282  rule lI's
"stop, look and inquire" mandate will affect both plaintiffs and defendants,
plaintiff's counsel may sometimes feel the greater initial impact since the thresh-
old question in every suit is whether or not to file the complaint. Rule I I is
specificaily designed to restrict access by deterring frivolous claims. Rule
26(b)(I)(iii), on the other hand, should expand access opportunities for cost-
conscious plaintiffs with nonfrivolous claims, especially in multiple defendant
settings. Applied sensitively, rules II and 26(b)( 1)(iii) have the potential for
restricting unwarranted filings while promoting fair access, benefiting both
plaintiffs and defendants.
Criticism of new rule 26(b)(l)(iii) has focused not on conceptual propriety,
but on problems of application. The "proportionality standard" has been de-
scribed as "nebulous" '28 3 and an invitation to "judicial arbitrariness.''284 Critics
note that a judge must determine "proportionality" without unduly restricting
discovery since liberal discovery is the heart of a notice pleading system. This is
thought to be a particularly onerous judgment call because "[t]he rule itself
provides no guidance as to [how the various factors are to be weighed in deter-
mining] whether discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive." 28 5
While lack of uniform application is a potential problem warranting continu-
ing scrutiny, it does not seem particularly troublesome. The goals of rule
26(b)(1)(iii) are clearly stated, and its factors are clearly identified. Judges with
litigation experience should at least have a basic sense for how those factors are
to be weighed.28 Consensus standards will evolve by word of mouth and judi-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971);
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 151 (1980).
282 See supra text accompanying note 250.
283 Cavanagh, supra note 41, at 799.
284 Sherman & Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80's-Making the Rules Work, 95
F.R.D. 245, 280 (1982).
28" Cavanagh, snpra note 41, at 799.
288 An additional concern is the traditional reluctance of judges to get involved in discovery
matters. Will a change in the discovery rules necessarily bring about the desired degree of judicial
supervision? Many possible explanations are given for traditional judicial reluctance, including the
desire to maintain a neutral appearance, insufficient familiarity with the substance of complex
areas of law and simply a lack of respect for and interest in discovery matters. id.
Reluctance to intervene is understandable when judges are already overburdened with heavy
case loads. However, studies indicate that this fear is unwarranted. Increased efficiency and re-
duced disposition time are the result of increased judicial control from the outset. See supra notes
58-80 and accompanying text.
Unless fundamental change is effected in both the philosophy underlying the rules and the
attitudes of bench and bar towards them, "the Discovery Rules will continue to deny justice to
those least able to bear the burdens of delay, escalating legal fees, and rising court costs." Order
on 1980 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000-01 (1980)
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cial opinions. On balance, the seemingly obtainable benefits of new rule
26(b)(1), especially in conjunction with new rule 16, appear to outweigh poten-
tial vagueness problems.
2. Rule 26(0)
An important 1980 addition to the rules, rule 26(f),27 authorizes optional
discovery conferences. The rule's purpose is to tentatively identify the "issues for
discovery purposes, establish . . . a plan and schedule of discovery,
set . . . limitations on discovery, if any .... .- 288 Rule 26(f) thus supple-
ments rule 16's provisions concerning pretrial conferences and the elimination of
wasteful pretrial activities and 26(b)(l)'s substantive standards for limiting dis-
covery. In Judge Schwarzer's experience, setting discovery guidelines tailored to
the needs of the case will "reduce subsequent discovery disputes and piecemeal
motions to compel or for protective orders, and tend to nip in the bud any
notion by a party to wage an attrition campaign using discovery as a
weapon."28
The limited availability of the discovery conference, however, tends to under-
(Powell, J., dissenting).
287 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) provides:
At any time after commencement of an action the court may direct the attorneys for the
parties to appear before it for a conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do
so upon motion by the attorneys for any party if the motion includes:
(1) A statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) A proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) Any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) Any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and
(5) A statement showing that the attorney making the motion has made a reasona-
ble effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the
motion. Each party and his attorney are under a duty to participate in good faith in
the framing of a discovery plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party.
Notice of the motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to
matters set forth in the motion shall be served not later than 10 days after service of
the motion.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively identifying
the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting
limitations on discovery, if any; and determining such other matters, including the alloca-
tion of expenses, as are necessary for the proper management of discovery in the action. An
order may be altered or amended whenever justice so requires.
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference to prompt
convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery conference with a pre-
trial conference authorized by Rule 16.
288 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
289 Schwarzer, supra note 181, at 407.
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mine its effectiveness. A discovery conference is authorized under the rule only
upon motion of one of the parties who establishes both parties' inability to
resolve discovery disputes privately. The practical concern of the drafters of
26(f) about unnecessary discovery conferences is warranted. Mandatory discov-
ery conferences would be wasteful in certain types of cases. The "solely at the
option of the parties" provision of rule 26(f), however, seems inconsistent with
the principle of managerial discretion embodied in rules 16 and 26(b)(1).2"o
Rules 16 and 26(b)(1), in concert, implicitly give judges the discretion to do on
their own initiative what rule 26(f) explicitly authorizes judges to do only upon
request of the parties. It makes sense to revise new rule 26(f) to authorize
judges to call discovery conferences on their own initiative as well as at the
request of parties. This would preserve the optional nature of the discovery
conference while giving the judge flexibility in managing cases. 29 1
3. Rule 2 6 (g)
New rule 26 (g) is the discovery counterpart to rule 11. A substantial portion
of the rule II analysis discussed above is applicable to subsections (1) and (2)
of rule 26 (g). The attorney signing a discovery request, response or objection
certifies that it has been formed after "reasonable inquiry" and that it is (1)
consistent with the discovery rules and warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for change in the law, (2) not interposed for any improper pur-
pose, and (3) not "unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive given the
needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in contro-
versy and the importance of the issues .... .
The scope of 26 (g) is limited. An attorney's signature on a discovery response
does not certify the truthfulness of the response. 293 The attorney only certifies
that she has made a reasonable effort to assure that her client has provided all
290 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
291 Justice Powell dissented to the 1980 amendments to rule 26(f) and other rules because the
changes did not go far enough towards controlling the discovery abuses:
I reiterate that I do not dissent because the modest amendments recommended by the
Judicial Conference are undesirable. I simply believe that Congress' acceptance of these
tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms. The
process of change, as experience teaches, is tortuous and contentious. Favorable congres-
sional action on these amendments will create complacency and encourage inertia. Mean-
while, the discovery Rules will continue to deny justice to those least able to bear the
burdens of delay, escalating legal fees, and rising court costs.
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
292 FED. R. Civ. P. 2 6 (g).
293 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note.
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available information responsive to the discovery request.29"
Prior to the adoption of rule 26 (g), discovery sanctions were infrequently
imposed both because of "confusion as to the range of available, and appropri-
ate sanctions and because of a perceived reluctance by many courts to impose
any sanctions.'9 New rule 26(g) explicitly requires that "sanctions be im-
posed on attorneys who fail to meet the [certification] standards .... .. 29. Ap-
propriate sanctions for violations include "an order to pay the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." ''
Unlike the provisions for monetary sanctions in rule 37, 26 (g) "deprives the
court the power to decide not to sanction a lawyer's failure to satisfy the sub-
stantive obligations the rule imposes.' '2 8 Once the court finds a violation of
rule 26(g) standards the judge must impose sanctions. Thus, rule 2 6 (g) estab-
lishes standards of behavior and requires the imposition of sanctions for trans-
gressions of those standards.
Rules 37(a)(4) and 37(d) do not mandate the imposition of monetary sanc-
tions for failure to perform acts specified in rule 37. The judge must still deter-
mine whether nonperformance (e.g., improper answer interrogatories) was "sub-
stantially justified.''299 Rules 37(a)(4) and 37(d) thus delineate specific acts
parties are to perform and vest discretion with the judge in deciding whether
nonperformance warrants sanctions.30 0 Practical experience suggests judicial reti-
' See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
295 Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys For Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On the
Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 680, 690-91 (1983).
296 FED. R. Civ. P. 2 6 (g) advisory committee note.
297 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). The Advisory Committee noted that the sanctions, which are specifi-
cally designed to curb discovery abuse, would be more effective if they were diligently applied
and "not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but
to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent." FED.
R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note (quoting National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey
Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)). For a discussion of the advantages of monetary sanctions to
curb discovery abuse see Brazil, supra note 1, at 921-37; Sofaer, supra note 295, at 696-731.
200 Brazil, supra note 1, at 939.
299 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), (d). Rule 37(b) does mandate the imposition of sanctions for
violations of a court's prior discovery order, including sanctions of contempt, defaults and admis-
sions of fact. Rule 37(b) differs from rule 26(g) and rules 37(a)(4) and 37(d) in that the former
rule only applies to violations of existing discovery orders entered ostensibly to resolve pending
discovery disputes, while the latter rules apply in the absence of prior court orders.
"0 See, e.g., Baker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 548-49 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (rule 37 accords
the trial judge "wide discretion in applying sanctions to protect the pretrial discovery process").
Commentators have noted that this discretionary approach "show(s] no evidence of being able to
control the abuses attendant upon excessive and burdensome discovery." Epstein, Corcoran,
Kreiger & Carr, An Update on Rule 37 Sanctions After National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Clubs, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 145, 171 (1980).
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cence in imposing rule 37 sanctions except for egregious misconduct.30 '
4. Summary of new rule 26
In contrast to Hawaii's rule 26, which essentially leaves the discovery process
to attorney control and provides for judicial control only in limited circum-
stances such as the issuance of protective orders, new federal rule 26 mandates
.greater judicial involvement in the discovery process and thus acknowledges
the reality that it cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis." 30' Under
the new rule, "[j]udges are encouraged [from the outset] to control discovery
more dosely, and the parties are encouraged to be less adversarial in their con-
duct.30 3 Moreover, new rules 16, 26(b)(1), 26(f) (as modified), and 26 (g) em-
power the judge to regulate discovery as the potential need for regulation is
perceived, rather than to wait for party initiation. 0 4
The amendments to federal rule 26 thus comprise a package designed to
reduce delay and cost arising out of "overuse" of discovery mechanisms. They
attempt to do so flexibly by establishing early judicial control as the standard
practice while providing for minimal or no judicial intervention in where war-
ranted. They attempt to reduce delay and cost not only to benefit litigants and
the court but also to expand access opportunities to those excluded from the
judicial process due to prohibitive cost. In so doing the new discovery rules are
designed to address the principal criticisms about the fairness of the pretrial
process. 
3 0 5
301 See, e.g., Wong v. City & County of Honolulu, 66 Haw. 389, 665 P.2d 157 (1983). A
1979-1985 survey by the ABA Section of Litigation revealed "relatively few cases where the
federal district courts have imposed sanctions for anything but the most egregious and abusive
behavior in the conduct of discovery. Dispositive sanctions are imposed, but only after provoca-
tions sufficient to try the patience of most saints. Monetary sanctions are imposed but generally
only in nominal amounts .... ." SANCTIONS, supra note 166, at 13. See generally National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (dismissal of an action
for failure to obey a discovery order).
302 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) advisory committee note. See CONNOLLY, HOLLEMAN & KUHLMAN,
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 77 (Federal Judicial Center
1978).
303 Sofaer, upra note 295, at 695.
504 New rule 26 also contemplates alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in combination
with discovery provisions. See Peckham, A Judicial Response, supra note 7. Under this system, two
stages of discovery would be adopted: (1) minimal discovery to enable the parties to make a
realistic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case; and (2) additional discovery
needed for trial if alternative dispute resolution mechanisms fail. Id. at 255.
"o The "unfairness" of the combination of undue delay and cost and the denial of fair access,
all arising out of overuse of discovery procedures, is aptly described by Justice Powell:
The mere threat of delay or unbearable expense denies justice to many actual or prospec-
tive litigants. Persons or businesses of comparatively limited means settle unjust claims and
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The time is right for the managerial judge in Hawaii's circuit courts. The
number of annual civil case filings in the circuit courts has risen dramatically
over the last ten years. Increasingly complex cases are being litigated. The cost
of litigating has soared. The Hawaii Judiciary's commitment to reducing litiga-
tion delay and pretrial cost is undisputed. The challenge is how best to act upon
that commitment as the civil litigation process in Hawaii continues to evolve.
The recently revised Circuit Court Rules for the First Circuit initiated
changes aimed at reducing the overall time of litigation. These rules have been
generally effective in establishing a single set of deadlines for all cases, but the
rules have not gone far enough. Judges still do not become involved in guiding
the pretrial development of a case. As a result, uncontrolled and excessive pre-
trial activity still occurs. The court-annexed mandatory arbitration program
promises to reshape the contours of the court's caseload. Ultimately, the pro-
gram will divert substantial numbers of simpler and smaller cases away from
the litigation system. The remaining cases will be predominantly larger and
more complex.
Civil judges will be called upon to exercise greater managerial control over
cases to expedite dispositions, lessen unnecessary pretrial activity and accompa-
nying costs and assure fair access to and treatment by the system.
Amending The Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure to incorporate new federal
rules 11, 16, 26(b)(1), 26(f) and 26 (g), with minor adjustments, will give civil
judges needed managerial powers. Rule 11 is designed to eliminate the waste
attendant to frivolous filings, focusing on reasonableness rather than good faith.
It modestly increases attorney's initial investigative duties by assuring that fil-
ings are reasonably grounded in fact and law. It also assures that a document is
not filed for an improper purposes such as delay or harassment.
Rule 16 authorizes pretrial conferences and gets the civil judge involved in
shaping the pretrial development of a case. It permits the judge to set timeta-
bles for pleadings, for joinder of parties and for discovery. In conjunction with
rules 26(b)(1) and 26(f0, rule 16 authorizes the court to participate from the
outset in shaping discovery according to the informational needs of the case, the
amount in dispute, the importance of the issues and the resources of the parties.
In adopting new rule 16, it has been suggested that the 120 day mandatory
scheduling order be excised from the rule. Administrative problems in the im-
plementation and ambiguous returns on the efficacy of the 120 day deadline
relinquish just claims simply because they cannot afford to litigate. Litigation costs have
become intolerable, and they cast a lengthening shadow over the basic fairness of our legal
system.
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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counsel caution at this time.
Rule 26(f) authorizes the court to call discovery conferences to define and
limit the course of discovery before abuses of the system occur. Suggestions
have been made to modify the rule to allow the court, as well as the litigants, to
trigger discovery conferences. This would make the rule consistent with the
broad managerial powers conferred upon judges by the other new rules.
Rule 26 (g) completes the package of managerial rules. It is the discovery
counterpart to rule 11 and authorizes the court to sanction unreasonable discov-
ery requests, responses or objections, or those filed for an improper purpose.
State and federal court experiences to date indicate that a carefule application
of the rules can yield positive results without unduly burdening attorneys, di-
minishing impartiality or impairing fair access to the system. The ultimate ben-
eficiaries are litigants and the public as a greater sense of proportionality and
fairness is restored to a much maligned system of justice.
